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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background
Tenure
continued

is

the

employment

right

for

teachers

free

from

unlawful,

capricious dismissal by a school board.

to

qualify

for

arbitrary,

and

Dismissal of tenured

teachers can only be initiated upon cause by the board of
education, and must provide the teacher with an opportunity
for due process procedures.

As it is conferred by legislative

action, it is only applicable to public school teachers.
Historically, the concept of teacher's tenure dates back
in the United States to the 1880s with the inception of the
civil

service plan under the

Andrew Jackson.

administration of

President

Civil service was developed as a result of

national criticism to the "spoils system" that had come into
prominence during that era.

On January 16, 1883, the first

civil service act was passed as

"An act to regulate and

improve the civil service of the United States,"

(22 Stat.

403).
In 1885, the matter of tenure of school officials was
brought

forth

Association.

as

a

proposal

by

the

National

Education

The tenure sought was a form of civil service
1

2

for

the

teaching

profession.

The

National

Education

Association concluded
that tenure for public school teachers would be for the
good of the schools and the general public, and that it
would protect the profession from personal or political
influence and be made free from the malignant power of
spoils and patronage. 1
Tenure developed rapidly following the civil service
plan of 1883.

The first statewide tenure law was enacted in

New Jersey in 1909.

Nationally, the basic objectives of the

different plans that followed were to protect teachers against
unjust removal after having undergone an adequate probationary
period by:

eliminating arbitrary intent

for demotion or

termination of position; minimizing malicious or capricious
acts; and setting aside political or partisan trends.

It was

also thought that with the added guarantees, the profession
would attract and retain quality teachers. 2
Between
legislative

1935
activity

and

1940

an

occurred.

astounding
The

National

amount

of

Education

Association (N.E.A.) reported that
23 percent of the teachers in the United States were
covered under tenure legislation in 1936.
In 1938,
twenty-one states had one or more tenure bills presented
to the legislature. New tenure laws of varying importance
were enacted in ten states.
Legislation covered
approximately 37 percent of all teachers in the U.S., an

1

A narration of the history and purpose of tenure
provided in Mcsherry v. City of St. Paul, 202 Minn. 102, 277
N.W. 541 (1938).
2

Ibid.

I

3

increase of 14 percent over a two-year period. 3
By 1947, 42.6 percent of teachers in the United States were
under tenure,
laws,

8.4

percent

contracts,
contracts

3 2 • 5 percent were under continuing contract

2.3
and

were

percent
11.2

under
were

laws

under

percent

were

permitting
laws

without

long-term

requiring
an

annual

legislature

protection. 4
Although tenure legislation developed rapidly, it did
not do so without controversy.

Teacher associations viewed

tenure as "the teachers' Bill of Rights.

115

The associations

felt that
although some districts employed fair and orderly
procedures in dismissal, many did not afford teachers the
same rights as a criminal on trial for his life-a hearing
as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Anything less than
dismissal for good and just cause established beyond doubt
by fair and just means, was a denial of democracy. 6
George

D.

Strayer,

a

proponent

of

teacher

tenure,

studied the operation of tenure law in Chicago in 1932.

His

conclusions regarding the "case for tenure" were expressed in
The Administration of Schools as follows:
1. It conforms to an increasing social concern for the
economic security of all works.
3 oonald

Dushane, "The status of Tenure Legislation,"
Journal of the National Education Association (May 1938) : 155.
4committee

on Tenure and Academic Freedom-National
Education Association, Teacher Tenure: Analysis and Appraisal,
Washington, D.C., 1947, p. 10.
511 sneak

1943): 540.
6

Ibid.

Attack on Education," The Clearing House,

(April

4

2.
Security of tenure tends to remove personal,
political, and other unprofessional pressures from
teachers.
3.
It places the emphasis of personnel practice on
improved methods of selection of teachers at entrance to
training as well as at the time of appointment.
4. It emphasizes good supervisory practices, placing a
premium on leadership rather than on coercive methods.
5.
It does not materially increase the difficulty of
removing the unprofessional teacher after a certain
length of service.
A teacher should be removed from
service
for
insubordination,
incompetency,
and
unprofessional conduct. 7
According to the 1943 American School Board Journal, not
everyone viewed tenure favorably, e.g., most notably school
boards

and

administrators.

It

was

feared

that

tenure

protection would prevent the dismissal of the incompetent
teacher,

making

the

position

of

the

permanent

teacher

impregnable. 8
At

a

panel

discussion

sponsored by

the

Lake Shore

Division of the Illinois Education Association in 1940, Dr.
E.H.

Hanson,

superintendent

of

schools

at

Rock

Island,

presented the following points in defense of not implementing
tenure:
1.
The people, through their boards of education,
should formulate and establish school policies. Would
tenure in practice nullify school policies?
Could
tenure legislation be drawn in a manner such that the
competent teacher can gain protection, yet boards of
education would not relinquish control?
2. The school system should insure that teachers will
grow professionally in order to preserve democracy and
7George

D. Strayer, The Administration of Schools, 1932
in Eloise P. Bingham, "Teachers Professional Problems !!Continuing Tenure," The Illinois Teacher (April 1940): 540.
811 courts

and Teacher Tenure,"
Journal (October 1943): 47.

American

School

Board

5

the best welfare of the children. Would the threat of
discharge be needed to force teacher growth?
3.
A school system should operate on sound business
principles. Does tenure legislation render impossible
any necessary retrenchment program? 9
The debate on tenure has continued.

over the years it

has been discussed relative to collective bargaining and most
recently to implementation of school reform.
Tenure controversy also spilled into the courtroom.

As

states adopted tenure laws, more often than not courts were
called upon to interpret dismissal decisions based statutory
tenure

regulations.

In

early

dismissal

cases,

judges

frequently determined whether a teacher was tenured or still
Decisions pointed toward a

within the probationary period.

necessity for fairness on the part of the school boards with
their staffs.
In one such case regarding fairness,
District of the city of Pittson,

Langan v. School

Pennsylvania

in 1939,

a

teacher was voted as tenured by a bare majority of the board
of education.
new

board

Two months later new members were elected.

without

notice

declared her contract void.

to

the

teacher,

by

The

resolution

Because her contract was void,

the board of education reasoned that no rights are to be
conferred by a void instrument.

The teacher felt that she was

within the tenure act and took her case to court.

The Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania ruled that:

911 Teacher

Tenure Legislation, "
Journal (December 1940): 32.

American

School

Board

6

if all that were required to void a teacher's contract
were a mere statement by the new board that the teacher
was not necessary at the time of her appointment, then the
safeguards of the tenure act would be valueless . • • 10
Recent

court

decisions

have

placed

the

meaning

of

teacher's tenure under a federal constitutional overlay of
substantive and procedural due process as guaranteed by the
14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Between

1972 and 1976 courts (federal and state) consistently applied
the U.S. Supreme Courts holdings.

Two federal supreme court

cases, Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann added
another dimension.

Prior to those decisions,

boards and

administrators had only to remain within the limitations of
state

statutes.

With

additional

guidelines,

personnel

decisions now were to be free from constitutional violations.
Taken together these cases balanced school board prerogatives,
with teacher constitutional rights. 11
Often

a

probationary or nontenure

teacher may have

asserted a property right when dismissed prior to the end of
a contract, but in general it is acknowledged that no property
interest existed beyond the end of a contract.
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study was twofold.

First, it sought

to examine and narrate the development of Illinois teacher
10

Langan v. School District of City of Pittson, 6 A. 2d 772
(1939).
Board of Regents v. Roth, et al., 92 s. ct. (1972), 408
U.S. 564, 33 L. Ed.2d 548 (1972); Perry et al., Sindermann,
etc., 408 U.S. 593, 33 L.E.2d 570 (1972).
11

7

employment statutes; and second, to analyze the dismissal of
tenured elementary and secondary teachers in public school
districts throughout the state.

Of the two issues which were

studied, the focal point was dismissal for cause of tenured
public school teachers between 1941 and 1989.

In order to

have deduced conclusions regarding teacher dismissal,

the

implications and effects of teacher employment legislation
upon dismissal needed to be addressed.

Further, in presenting

a thorough analysis and fostering a clear understanding of
current

teacher

dismissal

practices,

a

detailed

legal

background of employment provisions were provided pre-dating
tenure law to the year 1900.
It was a further purpose to establish an overview of
tenure law and court cases for future use by educators, school
board members, and researchers.
tool

which

would

assist

in

This overview could act as a
the

formulation

of

district

employment policies and guidelines or serve as a basis for
additional research.
Organization of the study
Both issues
tenured teachers,

in this study,

tenure and dismissal

were legally based.

Tenure

of

itself was

legislatively enacted in the Illinois Revised Statutes in
1941.
review

Procedures for teacher dismissal, including a judicial
of

employment,
tenure.

administrative
were

amended

decisions
into the

of

revised

termination

of

statutes under

Causes for dismissal were also listed in the Illinois

8

Revised Statutes, although in a separate section.
the primary source of documents to

Therefore,

be analyzed were the

Illinois Revised Statutes and Illinois court cases pertaining
to teacher dismissal at the appellate and supreme court levels
between 1900 and 1989.

Federal court cases were also reviewed

when the claims brought by teachers were believed to be a
violation
sources

of

of

the

United

information

States
were

Cons ti tut ion.

also

utilized

Secondary

and

included

dissertations and articles with respect to tenure and teacher
dismissal.
Through the use of content analysis of primary and
secondary

sources,

this

study

endeavored

to

answer

the

history

for

following research questions:
1.

What

was

the

legal

statutory

dismissal of tenured teachers

law

in elementary and

secondary public schools of Illinois?
2.

What was the legal case law history for dismissal
of tenured teachers

in elementary and secondary

public schools of Illinois?
3.

What were the trends and issues for dismissal of
tenured teachers in elementary and secondary public
schools of Illinois?

As Illinois courts did not allude to the political and
social aspects of tenure these concepts in case commentary,
were not included as research questions.
beyond the

Therefore, it was

scope of this dissertation to

delve

into the

9

political

and

social

aspects

of

this

country during

the

development of teacher tenure in Illinois.
In answering these research questions, secondary sources
such

as

dissertations

and

articles

from

educational

periodicals and law reviews were first surveyed to obtain a
general background of knowledge.

This information was found

through employing an Eric search and using Education Index and
west's Illinois Digest.
Primary sources, which were Illinois teacher employment
statutes and judicial cases from local and federal courts,
were

then

researched

for

information

relating to the topics of study.

more

specifically

All court case citations

were located in local and federal law indices.

Only court

cases which dealt with dismissal of elementary or secondary
tenure teachers for cause as specified in SEC. 10-22.4 were
selected.

This

section

stated

that

teachers

could

be

dismissed by a board of education for:
Incompetency, cruelty, negligence, immorality, or other
sufficient cause,
. failing to complete a one-year
remediation plan with a "satisfactory" or better rating,
and whenever, in its opinion, he is not qualified to
teach, or whenever, in its opinion, the interests of the
schools require its. . . 12
In

order

to

answer

the

research

questions

posed,

statutes and court cases were sectioned into time periods
historically significant to teacher employment legislation.
Within each time period statutes and case law were examined

12

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 10-22.4 (1988).

10
separating Chicago from downstate school districts.
districts were not

These

intermixed as Chicago was governed by

different state statute, than those school districts in the
rest of the state.
Once the statutes and court cases were grouped according
to a designated time period, the conclusions of the study were
developed by analyzing the following variables:
1.

Criteria for dismissing tenured teachers identified
in the Illinois Revised Statutes from 1941 to 1989.

2.

Types of teacher dismissal cases heard by Illinois
courts between 1900 and 1989.

3.

Grounds for dismissal cited by the school board.

4.

Allegations,

behaviors,

and actions cited by the

school board to establish grounds for dismissal.
5.

Issues brought forward by the dismissed tenured
teacher in appealing the school board's dismissal
decision.

6.

Rationale

given

by

the

Illinois

courts

for

reversals or affirmations of public school board
decisions.
7.

Major elements that influenced changes in dismissal
law

for

tenured

teachers

in

Illinois

public

schools.
Definition of Terms
The following legal terms were defined to facilitate
clarity and understanding when used in the investigation of

11
this

Definitions

study.

were

taken

from

Barron's

Law

Dictionary 13 unless otherwise indicated.
Adjudicate:

The determination of a controversy and a

pronouncement of a judgment based on evidence presented.
Affirm:

The assertion of a

higher court that

the

judgment of the court below is correct and should stand.
Amend:
Appeal:

The alteration of an established law.
A resort to a higher court for the purpose of

obtaining a review of a lower court decision and a reversal of
the lower court's judgment or the granting of a new trial.
Appellant:

The party who appeals a decision and brings

the proceeding to a reviewing court.

(This party may also be

referred to as the challenger, appealer, or contender.)
Board:

Board of directors, board of education, or board

of school inspectors. 14
Cause:
specified

in

Teacher dismissal reasons from employment as
state

tenure

law.

(The

responsibility

for

substantiating cause rested with the initiating school board.
In

the

Illinois

Revised

Statutes,

cause

was

incompetency, cruelty, negligence, and immorality.

defined

as

It further

empowered a board of education to dismiss a teacher for "other
sufficient cause", whenever, in the opinion of the board, "the
interests of the schools required it, " or whenever,

13

steven H. Gifis, Barron's Law Dictionary
Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1984).
14

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 24-10 (1988).

in the

(New York:

12
opinion of the board,
teach."

the teacher was

"not qualified to

Temporary mental or physical incapacity to perform

teaching duties or marriage were not a cause for dismissal. 15
Charges:

Specific acts or incidents which establish or

support one or more of the causes for dismissal. 16
Dismissal:

Termination of the teacher's services for

cause by action of the school board prior to the

lawful

expiration of the contract. 17
Liberty Interest:
administrative

action

disability that
advantage
injured

of

that

An infringement by a school board or
which

forecloses

other

imposes

stigma

the teacher's

employment

employee's

a

good

freedom

opportunities
name

or

or

or

other

to

take

otherwise

reputation

in

the

community. 18
Plaintiff:

The party who initially brings the suit or

seeks remedy in a court of law.

(This party may also be

referred to as complainant, accuser, claimant, or litigant.
Probationary Service:

A trial period of employment

served by teachers before being eligible for tenure.

(It was

required of teachers in Illinois school districts outside of
15 I

d . , Sec. 10-22. 4 ( 1988) .

16

Gerard E. Dempsey, Formal Dismissal and Suspension
Procedures Under Illinois Tenure Law (Chicago, Illinois:
Institute for Continuing Legal Education, 1985), 13.22
17Nancy

Sindelar, "Issues and Outcomes of Federal Court
Cases Involving Teachers Dismissed for Incompetent Behavior:
1900 to 1986" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Loyola University, 1986).
18

MINN. STAT. ANN., 1984.

13
Chicago, to serve two years of probationary service, before
qualifying for contractual continued service.

Teachers of

Chicago must have served three years before the conferment of
a permanent appointment. ) 19
Procedural Rights:

"Due process" rights that safeguard

the protection of an individual's substantive rights.

To

compel due process protection, the teacher must show that a
sufficient "property" or "1 iberty" interest was present. 20
Property Interest:
continued employment.
Statutory Law:

A legitimate claim of entitlement to

(In terms of teacher tenure.)
An act of the

legislature,

adopted

pursuant to its constitutional authority.
Substantive Rights:

Rights that are guaranteed by the

U.S. and state constitutions to "liberty" and to "property",
and those constitutionally valid statutory rights granted by
the Legislature. 21
Teacher:
required

to

Any or all school district employees regularly
be

certified

under

laws

relating

to

the

certification of teachers.~
Tenure:
continued

The right for a teacher to be eligible for

employment

free

from

unlawful,

capricious dismissal by a school board.
19
20

arbitrary,

(In Illinois, tenure

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Secs. 24-10 and 34-84 (1988).

MINN. STAT. ANN., 1984.

21Id.
22

and

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 24-10 ( 1988) .

14

in school districts outside of Chicago is referred to as
contractual

continued employment;

while

in

Chicago

it

is

called a permanent appointment. ) 23
Writ of Certiorari:

A common law writ, issued from a

superior court to one of inferior jurisdiction, commanding the
latter to certify and return to the former the record in the
particular case.

{The writ is issued in order that the court

issuing it may inspect the proceedings and determine whether
there has been any irregularities.
Writ of Mandamus:

A writ issued from a court to an

official compelling performance of a ministerial act that the
law recognizes as an absolute duty, as distinct from other
types

of

acts

discretion.

that

may

be

a

matter

of

the

official's

{It is used only when all other judicial remedies

have failed or were inadequate.)

nld. at secs. 24-10 and 34-84 {1988).

CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TENURE IN ILLINOIS
Introduction
This chapter seeks to overview teacher tenure laws and
other teacher employment legislation in Illinois from 1909 to
In doing so, dismissal procedures that generated from

1989.

tenure

law will be emphasized.

analyze

legislation

from

the

Chapters thereafter will
Illinois

Revised

Statutes

pertaining to dismissal of tenured teachers and accompanying
case law from the state and federal levels in a chronological
fashion.
Early History of Tenure in Illinois:

1917-1941

The concept of tenure is not new to Illinois.

Teachers

and principals of Chicago have been provided with a type of
tenure

status

appointment

by

since
merit

1917,

that

upon

has

provided

fulfilling

satisfactory probationary service. 1

three

permanent
years

of

The permanency of the

appointment has been subject to the rules of the board of
education for conduct and efficiency and subject to removal
for cause by the members of the board of Education. 2
1

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 138 (1917).

2 Id.

at sec. 161 (1917).
15

At this

16

same time however, teachers in Illinois downstate districts
have not been provided with any type of rights associated with
tenure.

It has been within the powers and duties of the

boards of these districts to dismiss teachers.
In districts with one thousand to one hundred thousand
inhabitants, the boards of education could "dismiss and remove
a teacher, whenever in their opinion he was not qualified to
teach,

or whenever in their opinion the

school require it. 113

interests of the

School districts with under one thousand

inhabitants, were governed by school directors.

Statutorily,

they

teacher

also

had

incompetency,

the

right

cruelty,

to

"dismiss

negligence,

a

immorality

or

for
other

sufficient cause." 4
Although state statute specified that dismissal be based
on some type of cause in the early 1900s, no district of any
type mandated that any form of due process be given to the
teacher before

termination of

employment.

Prior to

the

enactment of tenure law, Illinois courts at various levels of
the judicial system issued rulings to reaffirm the guidelines
of the state statute and prohibited the removal or dismissal
of teachers during the period of their annual contracts unless
boards could prove cause.
In one such case, the Illinois Supreme Court held in
Hartmann v. the Board of Education of Westville Township High
3

Id. at Sec. 127a (1917).

4Id.

at Sec. 115 (1917).

17
school District No.

220, 5 that boards of education had the

power to dismiss teachers during the course of their contracts
for cause only.

The power of dismissal or removal "was not

intended to bestow upon ..•

[boards of education] arbitrary

power to dismiss without cause,
reason for such dismissal. 116

and without specifying any

Other cases followed Hartmann 7

in the 1930s, but did not produce any change in the teacher
dismissal process.

Concurrently, there was no new legislation

enacted which would allow for any type of protection of a
teaching position.
It was

not until July 1,

1941

in the

Sixty-second

General Assembly, that the legislature followed Chicago's lead
and established law while afforded teachers greater employment
security for downstate school districts.

Section 136b of the

Illinois Revised Statutes was created for districts with a
board of directors and less than one thousand inhabitants,
which SEC. 136c applied to districts with a board of education
and with more than one thousand but less than five hundred
thousand inhabitants. 8

Chicago was excluded from both of

these provisions and remained covered under SEC. 161.
Section

136b

provided

terms

of

employment

whereby

5

Hartmann v. Board of Education of Westville Township
Hiqh School District No. 220, 356 Ill., 577, 191 N.E. 279
(1934).
6

Id.

7 Id.
8 ILL.

REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Secs. 136b and 136c (1941).

18

teachers, principals, and superintendents would be eligible
for a contract of not more than a three year time period,
after having fulfilled two years of consecutive probationary
service in a district.

This section further stipulated that

all employees were
to be notified not later than March 15 of the year in
which any regular employment contract expires, whether he
is to be reemployed • • • If the teacher is not to be reemployed, he must be given reasons in writing. 9
Section 136c's provisions differed somewhat.

Whereas

teachers in smaller districts with board of directors were
delegated eligibility for continuing contracts; teachers in
larger districts with board of education and school inspectors
and covered under SEC. 136c, could gain tenure or contractual
continued service.

The four most critical elements of tenure

as outlined in SEC. 136c were:

1) the probationary period; 2)

causes for dismissal; 3) the right to a hearing; and 4) the
right to an appea1. 10
1) The Probationary Period
After two years of probation, at least one of which had
to be after July 1, 1941, teachers were placed on contractual
continued service until the age of sixty-five, unless they
were given the notice of dismissal with reasons at least sixty
days

before

the

end

of

such

probationary

period.

The

probationary period could have been extended to three years

9 Id.
10

at Sec. 136b (1941).

rd. at Sec. 136c (1941).
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for teachers who had no previous teaching experience. 11
2) causes for Dismissal of Tenured Teachers
Causes for dismissal were those that were mentioned in
SECS. 115 and 127 of the Illinois Revised Statutes.
115

named

specifically

immorality,

incompetency,

cruelty,

or other sufficient cause. 12

Section

negligence,

Section 127 read

that the board may dismiss any teacher "whenever,

in the

opinion of the board of education, he is not qualified to
teach, or whenever, in the opinion of the board of education,
the interests of the schools may require

it. 1113

After a

teacher was conferred with tenure, that teacher could not be
dismissed until it was approved by a majority vote of all
members of the board of education;

after due notice with

reasons for dismissal in writing; and after a hearing by the
board if requested by the teacher within ten days after the
notice of dismissal. 14
3) The Right to a Hearing
The teacher had the right to a hearing al though the
statutes did not specify who the hearing officer should be.
This hearing could be made public at the request of either
teacher or the school board.

Specifically, the teacher was

given the right to be present with counsel and to cross11 Id.
12 Id.

at Sec. 115 (1941).

13

Id. at Sec. 127 (1941).

14

Id. at Sec. 136c (1941).
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examine

witnesses;

the

right

to

present

defenses

to

the

charges against him or her; and the right to call upon the
board to subpoena witnesses for the teacher up to the limit of
ten witnesses.

It was the responsibility of the board to

arrange for a stenographic record of the proceedings at the
hearing.

A transcript of such record would be available at

the cost of the party requesting it. 15
4) The Right to an Appeal
Teachers also had the right to appeal the decision of
the employing board through an appeal committee appointed by
the county superintendent of schools.

The appeal committee

would review the evidence as recorded and if it found such
action justified, reverse the decision of the employing board.
This action would then reinstate the teacher to the former
position. 16
Post-Tenure Law:
Between

1941

and

1961

1941-1961
most

changes

in

the

law

represented a clarification and a refinement in the language
of the original tenure act.

The most major change in the

statute was the restructuring of SECS. 136b and 136c which
then became SECS. 24-10 to 24-12.
Section 136b, which dealt with terms of employment for
teachers

in

a

district

with

a

board

of

directors,

was

renumbered to SEC. 24-10 and except for a few minor changes,

21
the language virtually remained the same.

The thrust of this

statute was that teachers who fell within the jurisdiction of
SEC. 24-10, were not eligible for the same due process rights,
(a hearing for instance) as outlined in SECS. 24-11 and 2412. 17
An Illinois Supreme Court decision in 1946,

Pack v.

Sporleder, 18 made it clear that SEC. 136b (SEC. 24-10) had no
provision for specific charges against a teacher or any of the
other

procedures

Accordingly,

as

set

forth

in

SEC.

136c

(24-12).

in Pack supra, written notice to a teacher by

board of school directors, setting forth its reasons why a
teacher was not to be rehired, was sufficient compliance with
this section. 19
Previously, SEC. 136c included both terms of employment
and

procedures

for

dismissal

of tenured

numbering of the 1961 revision,
parts--SEC.

24-11

which

outlined

split SEC.
terms

contractual continued service and SEC.
dismissal

procedures

for

teachers. 20

teachers,

of

The

136c into two
employment

of

24-12 which listed
both

districts with a board of education or a

applicable

to

board of school

inspectors. 21
17Id. at Sec. 24-10 (1941).
18Pack v. Sporleder, 394 Ill. 130, 67 N.E. 2d 198 (1946).
19Id.
20 ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Secs. 24-11 and 24-12 (1961).
21Id.
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No significant changes occurred in SEC. 24-11.

In the

first paragraph of this section, "school term" was rewritten
to read "one year" relative to full-time teaching experience
prior to

the probationary period.

It also

required the

employing board to give written notice of an extension of
probationary period at least sixty days before the "end of the
period of two consecutive school terms 1122 in lieu of "notice
before the end of such two-year period. 1123
Alterations to SEC.

24-12 dealt mainly with teacher

dismissal regarding an increase in the school population.

The

effect of change in boundaries of school districts by reason
of the

creation of a

new school district

on contractual

continued service status of teachers, was added in 1949 and
incorporated

into

the

amended again in 1955.

1961

revision. 24

That

section was

Added to SEC. 24-12 {then 136c), was

the proviso that
the board must first remove all teachers who had not
entered upon contractual continued service,
before
removing teachers who had entered upon such service in the
event such removal was the result of a decrease in the
number of teachers employed or the discontinuance of
teaching services. 25
Thus, when positions were going to be eliminated, non-

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch ap. 122, Sec.
word •term' replaced the word 'year•.
22 In

23

24-11 { 1961 ) , t h e

The phrase 'one-year' and •two-year period' were both
located in ILL. REV. STAT., Chap. 122, Sec. 136c {1941).
~Id. at Sec. 136c {1949).
25

Id.

(1955).
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tenured teachers would be discharged before tenured teachers.
This same section also required that when the board reinstated
positions,

tenured teachers were to be rehired over non-

tenured so far as they were legally qualified to hold such
positions.

Reasons for dismissal were stated in SEC. 10-22.4,

applicable

to

governed

by

inspectors.

board
boards

of

director

of

education

districts
and

and

boards

districts
of

school

Those causes did not precipitate dismissal for

Chicago teachers as different procedures were dictated under
a separate statute, SEC. 34-85.

That statute did not define

the limitations for cause; rather it stated that teachers may
only be removed for it. 26
Causes
incompetency,

for

dismissal

cruelty,

in

SEC.

negligence,

10-22.4 ·included

immorality

or

other

sufficient cause and whenever in the opinion of the board a
teacher was not qualified to teach, or whenever in the opinion
of the board the interests of the schools required it.

A 1949

amendment added that marriage was not a cause for removal. 27
The Hearing Officer:

1975

The year 1975 brought a notable addition to tenure law-an impartial hearing officer and rules thereof for dismissal
of a tenured teacher.

Prior to the new regulations, a hearing

had to be requested by the teacher in writing within a period
of ten days after the service of notice.
uid. at Sec. 34-85 (1961).
Vrd. at Secs. 6-36 and 7-13.

The hearing would be

24

held and the decision rendered within a period of sixty days,
with a ten-day interval between the notice and the hearing. 28
With the 1975 legislation, the board of education was
required to schedule a hearing, "unless the teacher within ten
days requests in writing of the board that no hearing be
1129

scheduled

In other words, the burden of requesting

a hearing previously was the responsibility of the teacher.
With new legislation a hearing was automatic, unless a teacher
sought the contrary.

The hearing was to be scheduled between

thirty and sixty days after an approval of a motion to dismiss
by the board of education. 30
The

highlight

of

the

statute was

that

the

hearing

officer was to be selected from a list of five prospective
impartial hearing officers, provided by the State Board of
Education.

The teacher and the board or their authorized

agents or attorneys would then alternately strike one name
from the list until only one name remained.
then become the hearing officer. 31

That person would

This 1975 legislation

meant that boards of education could no longer serve as the
hearing body.
Another change regarding dismissal in 1975, involved the
list of causes in SEC. 10-22.4.
~Id.
29Id.

30Id.
31Id.

at Sec. 24-12 {1975).

To the already established

25
list,

it

was

added

that

temporary

mental

or

physical

incapacity to perform teaching duties as found by a medical
examination was not a cause for dismissal. 32
Post-Reform:

1985

since the inception of the first tenure statute in 1941
for districts outside of Chicago,

there has been a clause

included which referred to remediability of cause.
to SEC. 136c it read:

According

"Before service of notice of charges on

account of cause that may be deemed to be remediable, there
shall be given the teacher reasonable warning in writing,
stating specifically the causes which,

if not removed, may

result in charges. 1133
When

it

was

determined

that

a

tenured

teacher's

performance would possibly call for dismissal, the district
would have proceeded to ascertain whether the causes were
remediable or non-remediable.

If the causes were remediable,

then a notice to remedy was to be sent out to the teacher to
allow reasonable time to correct those causes before a formal
motion to dismiss was made.
Remediability versus irremediability was a subject of
controversy in several court cases.

Gilliland v. Board of

Education, illustrated the difference between the two terms in
1977, when the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that:
A cause
32

for

discharge

may

Id. at Sec. 10-22.4 (1975).

Eld. at Sec. 136c (1941).

be

deemed

irremediable

if

26
evidence indicated that damage had been done to the
students, the faculty, or the school itself, and that the
damage could not have been corrected if timely written
warnings had been given by the teacher's superiors.
Uncorrected causes for dismissal which originally were
remediable in nature can become irremediable if continued
over a long period of time.~
In 1985, the additional stipulation of a remediation
period of

one-year was

clause of SEC.

24-12.

legislated

into

the

remediability

A remediation plan of one year was

applicable, beginning with the 1986-87 school, if the teacher
had deficiencies which were deemed remediable and had been
given

an

evaluation

rating

of

"unsatisfactory. 1135

(The

district itself defined the standards of unsatisfactory under
ART. 24A.)

Teachers whose deficiencies were determined to be

irremediable by the board of education were not subject to a
one-year remediation period.

However, districts were still

bound to the other procedures for dismissal defined in SECS.
24-12 and 34-85, such as notice or hearing.
The remediation plan was designed to correct the cited
deficiencies.

The teacher who was rated unsatisfactory, as

well as a district administrator qualified under SEC. 24-3 and
a

consulting

teacher

selected

by

the

participating

administrator or the principal of the teacher who had been
rated unsatisfactory,

must participate in the remediation

34

Gilliland v. Board of Education of Pleasant View
Consolidated School District No. 622 of Tazewell County, 67
Ill.2d 143, 8 Ill. Dec. 84, 365 N.E.2d 322 (1977).
35

under the reform act of 1989 for the City of Chicago,
teachers who have been rated satisfactory were subject to a
forty-five day remediation period.

27

plan. 36
Participating administrators evaluated and rated the
teacher on remediation, on a quarterly basis over a year's
time.
the

A consulting teacher's role was to provide advice to
teacher

successfully

on

how

complete

to
the

improve

teaching

remediation

skills

plan.

and

It was

to
not

permissible for a consulting teacher to evaluate the teacher
on remediation. 37

If the teacher under remediation did not

complete the one-year remediation period with a "satisfactory"
or better rating, he was subject to dismissal for cause under
SEC. 10-22.4. 38
Nontenured Teachers
While this paper is concerned only with the analysis of
dismissal of tenured teachers, the confines of nontenured or
probationary teachers need to be explained in order to present
a more complete picture of tenure.
Illinois employment statutes, such as SEC. 24-11 and 3484,

mandated that districts

follow

certain procedures

in

dismissing teachers, varying according to whether a teacher
was

probationary

or

tenure.

Procedures

for

dismissing

teachers and the definition of tenured versus probationary,
were specified by the size of the district.
Tenure and dismissal procedures for teachers in school
36

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Art. 24A-5 (1985).

37Id.
38

Id. at Sec. 10-22.4--Effective January 1, 1988.
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districts

with

a

population

having

less

than

500,000

inhabitants were outlined in 1989, in SECS. 24-11 to 24-16.
This

included

boards

of

educations,

boards

inspectors and boards of school directors.

of

school

Falling within

this category were "special charter districts, and community
unit

districts,

consolidated

high

school

districts."~

districts,

(Districts

of

and
this

community
type

were

often referred to as "downstate," because they were outside of
Chicago.)

Employment status in those districts was referred

to as a contractual continued service, with a probationary40
length of two school terms.
Sections

34. 84

to

34. 85b

applied

to

teachers

district with a population of over 500,000 people.

in

a

Thus far,

the only city falling into this category has been Chicago.
Section 34. 85 labeled tenure as permanent appointment.

Length

of probationary service time was three years before being
eligible for such appointment.
First-Year Probationary Teachers
Chicago

teachers

must

have

served

three

years

of

'probationary' service before being qualified for permanent
appointment.

Prior to September 1, 1989, the term teacher

included both teachers and principals whereby both groups were

39 Lee

O. Garber and H. Hayes Smith, Law and the Teacher
in Illinois (Danville, Illinois, 1965), p. 70.
40

Probationary was defined as "serving for trial ... " in
Anderson v. Board of Education of School District No. 91, 390
Ill. 412, 61 N.E.2d 579 (1945).

29
eligible for tenure rights.
amended

to

include

only

permanent appointment.

Since that time,

teachers

as

being

the law was
eligible

for

No distinction was made in terms of

due process rights for first through third-year probationary
teachers

in

included

notice

Rights

Chicago.
and

due

reason with

all

probationary
final

teachers

decisions

for

dismissal made by the school board. 41
The first probationary year for teachers covered under
SEC.

24-11 42

in downstate districts,

was described as any

'
"full time employment
from a date before November 1 through

the end of the school year. "

If the board decided not to

rehire the teacher for the next school year, written notice
must have been given at least sixty days before the end of the
school term.
the

If the school board failed to give notice before

specified

reemployed

for

timeline,
the

the

following

teacher
school

would

be

term. 43

considered
Notice

for

first-year probationaries did not require including the reason
for the non-renewal.
Second-Year Probationary Teachers
Second-year probationary teachers were those completing
their second consecutive years of full-time teaching in a

41

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 34-85 (1988).

4211 Teacher"

meant any or all school district employees
required to be certified under laws relating to the
certification of teachers. - ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 2411 (1985).
43

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 24-11 (1985).
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district.

Should the district not want the teacher to enter

into contractual continual service (tenure), written notice
and reasons for dismissal were to be sent to the teacher by
certified mail

(with return receipt)

at

least sixty days

before the end of the second term. 44
If the teacher had not had one school term of full time
teaching before the two-year probationary period, the school
board, at its discretion, may have extended this period for
one additional school year.
certified mail

sixty days

consecutive school term.

This notice had to be sent by
before the

end

of the

second,

The notice had to state the reasons

for the extension and outlined the corrective actions which
the teacher needed to take in order to satisfactorily complete
probation. 45
summary
The

intent

of

providing tenure

in

Illinois was

to

provide teachers in public schools with protection against
arbitrary dismissals and a continuing guarantee of employment.
Additionally, it allowed for a legal and systematic method of
dismissing the inefficient teacher.
Tenure was first conferred to teachers in Chicago in
1917.

The rest of the state followed suit in 1941, with SECS.

136b and 136c of Chap. 122 of the Illinois Revised Statutes.
Section 136b provided teachers in smaller districts with a

31
board

of

directors,

notification.

continuing

contracts

subject

to

Larger districts governed by a board of school

inspector or a board of education, followed the regulations of
SEC. 136c.

This statute allowed teachers to be eligible for

contractual continued service after a two-year probationary
period.

Teachers under contractual continued service could

only be dismissed for cause,
hearing.

with notice,

reasons,

and a

Tenure continued to be refined over the years.

In

1961, the language of the original statute was refined for
more clarity.

The numbering was also changed to its present

state--SECS. 136b and 136c became SECS. 24-10 and 24-11 to 2412.
Separate regulations for board of director districts
were eliminated in 1967, when these districts were added to
those under the provisions listed in SEC. 24-11.

Regulations

for Chicago continued to remain apart from others under SECS.
34-84 and 34-85.

Two additional changes have been made to

tenure legislation in the last two decades:

an impartial

hearing officer in 1975 and a one-year remediation period for
unsatisfactory teachers after 1985.
First and second-year probationary teachers were not
considered to be tenured.
legal procedures
classifications.

The statutes specified different

for dismissal

of personnel

in those two

First-year probationaries could be dismissed

with only notice and second-year with notice and reason.
Although the direction tenure will take in the future is
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unclear, it will undergo continual judicial interpretations.
chapter Three examines statutes and past interpretations of
case law dealing with tenure during the years 1900 to 1961.

CHAPTER 3
EARLY HISTORY OF TENURE IN ILLINOIS
1900-1961
Introduction
Illinois teacher employment legislation between 1900 and
1961

was

characterized

by

the

establishment

of

uniform

Regulations governing tenure were

guidelines for tenure.

amended to the Illinois Revised statutes in 1917, for teachers
of Chicago and in 1941,
outside Chicago.
teachers
According

against
to

for board of education districts

Tenure was designed specifically to protect
the

one

capricious

Illinois

action of

Appellate

Court

school
in

boards.

1949,

the

objective of tenure was to:
Improve the Illinois school system by assuring teachers of
experience and ability a continuous service and a rehiring
based upon merit rather than failure to rehire upon
reasons that are political, partisan, or capricious. 1
Tenure in Illinois developed on two different fronts.
On one front was Chicago and on the other was all districts
outside of Chicago.

Historically, the initiatives of Chicago

paved the way for tenure legislation in Chicago and districts
1

Betebenner v. Board of Education of West Salem Community
High School District No. 201, et al., 336 Ill. App. 448, 84
N.E.2d 569 (1949).
33
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outside

Chicago

districts)
tenure

(also

referred

remained separate,

law

evolved

in

to

as

downstate

school

each affecting the other as

Illinois.

Thus,

relationship formed between the two.

an

interactive

In this study of tenure

law in Illinois, both statutes and accompanying case law were
examined

from

1900

to

1961.

Within

this

frame,

tenure

statutes and related case law were analyzed regarding the
dismissal of elementary and high school teachers.
One of the outcomes of tenure law and teacher dismissal
cases was that quite often tenured teachers and employers
reached

a

settlement

settlements,

without

of course,

using

litigation.

Those

are not included in case law and,

therefore, are not part of this study.
Teacher Employment Policy in Illinois Downstate School
Districts:

1900-1940

Before the establishment of tenure law for downstate
districts in Illinois in 1941, there was only one statutory
guideline

for

school

boards

to

follow when

dismissing

a

teacher.

More specifically, Illinois state statute vested

boards of education and boards of directors with the power to
dismiss teachers for cause.

However,

each type of school

district governing board had different powers in relation to
dismissing teachers for cause.
Illinois

Revised

Statutes

In 1900, CHAP.

outlined

the

122 of the

following

powers,

accorded to board of director and board of education districts
when dismissing teachers:
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Section 115: The BOARD OF DIRECTORS Cin districts
with under 1.000 inhabitants) shall be clothed with the
power to ••• dismiss a teacher for incompetency, cruelty,
negligence, immorality, or other sufficient cause. 2
Section 127: The BOARD OF EDUCATION (in districts
with of l, 000 and not over 100, 000 inhabitants) shall have
all the powers of school directors, be subject to the same
limitations, and in addition thereto they shall have the
power ••• to dismiss and remove any teacher, whenever in
their opinion he is not qualified to teach, or whenever in
their opinion the interests of the school require it. 3
Cause for teacher dismissal for board of education or
board of

inspector districts was divided

into two parts.

Section 115, the first part, dealt with the actual conduct of
the teacher and included incompetency, cruelty, negligence,
immorality, or other sufficient cause and applied to board of
director and board of education districts. 4
SEC.

The second part,

"Whenever in the opinion of the board he is not

127,

qualified to teach or whenever in their opinion the interests
of the school require it" applied only to board of education
districts. 5

This latter type of cause depended on the opinion

of the board of education.
In Board of Education v. Stotlar, in 1901, the Illinois
Appellate Court made a distinction between SECS. 115 and 127
when it stated that:
Whenever in their opinion the interests of the school
require it was the cause in itself and was separate from
2 ILL.

REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 115 (1900).

3 Id.

at Sec. 127.

4Id.

at Sec. 115.

5

Id. at Sec. 127.
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incompetency, cruelty, negligence,
sufficient cause. 6

immorality,

or other

Although SECS. 115 and 127 enumerated cause, no legal
safeguards were embodied into those sections which would have
obligated boards to offer teachers any form of due process,
such as notice or a hearing, upon being discharged from duty.
Thus, teachers were open to possible political or arbitrary
dismissals by school officials as "sufficient cause" and "best
interests" allowed boards of education a broad interpretation.
Three of the five Illinois appellate and circuit court cases
between 1900 and 1916, used either the "best interests" or
"sufficient cause" as a reason for dismissal.

However, school

districts had to predetermine that these two causes were
reasons for dismissal at the time of discharge.

When one

district tried to add "the interests of the school require it"
as a cause for teacher dismissal during a court hearing, the
appellate court ruled in 1911 that:

"causes for dismissal

contained in the order removing a school teacher were binding
upon directors" 7 and they were estopped from showing other or
different cause.
Stotlar8 also recognized, that dismissal under the "best
interests" clause could possibly be capricious.

That issue

regarding teacher dismissals was not addressed again after
6

Board of Education v. Stotlar, 95 Ill. App. 250 (1901).

7

Darter v. Board of Education of School District No. 30,
Ill. App. 284 (1911).
8

stotlar, 95 Ill. App. 250.
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Stotlar until 1934 when the Illinois Supreme Court stated that
although boards of education were vested with the power to
dismiss and remove teachers from their job, it wasn't intended
that it be done arbitrarily or without any reasonable or just
cause.

This court further indicated that:

'Whenever, in the opinion of the board of education he is
not qualified to teach, or whenever, in the opinion of the
board of education, the interests of the school require
it,' is but another cause of removal. 9
Sections 115 and 127 wording remaining unchanged through
the period between 1900 to 1940.
renumbered

SECS.

respectively. 10

115

and

Section

136b

specified causes of SECS.
teachers

in

districts

board

of

of

under

continued contract. 11

127

to

was

SECS.
added

123 and 136

inspector

one

An amendment

hundred

and

in 19 2 5,

123

and

136

along

with

the

in 1927,
board

thousand

of

and gave
education

inhabitants

a

Board of director districts of under

one thousand inhabitants were not adopted into SEC.

136b,

until 1937. 12
A continued
contractual

contract

continued

outlined in CHAP.

was

service.

122, SEC.

not

to

be

Continued

confused
contracts

with
as

136b, of the Illinois Revised

Statutes of 1927, provided that school districts could confer
9Hartmann

v. Board of Education of Westville Townshin
High School District 220, 356 Ill. 577, 191 N.E. 279 (1934).
10

ch. 122, Secs. 123 and 136 (1925).

11

rd. at sec. 136b (1927).

12

rd. at Sec. 136b (1937).

38

teachers with a

contract of up to three years

teacher had taught
service.

two

consecutive years

after the

of probationary

Principals and superintendents were also eligible

for a continued contract.

Under SEC. 136b, if dismissal of a

contracted teacher was warranted, it had to be for cause as
elaborated
127). 13

in SECS.

12 3

and

13 6

(formerly SECS.

115 and

Section 136b also stated that when teaching positions

were eliminated,

it was permissible for a

dismiss

stating the

without

cause.

school board to

However under

those

conditions, the district had to give the teacher notice prior
to

sixty

days

before

the

end

of

statement of an honorable dismissal.

the

school

year

and

a

Notice was not required

when a district decided not to renew a teacher's contract at
the end of the contract period. 14
A continued contract offered teachers a longer contract
length, but no real protection.

There was no obligation on

the part of the school board at the end of the contract period
to renew, regardless of the triviality of the reason or lack
of reason to nonrenew.

Because the teacher did not have any

form of permanent position with a

district,

there was no

requirement to rehire at the end of the contract period, nor
was there any due process requirement.
When the Illinois legislature amended the school code to
include continued contracts, the legality of the continued
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contract was challenged with respect to ART. 8, SEC. I of the
Illinois

Constitution

in

1940.

This

passage

of

the

constitution of Illinois stated that "the General Assembly
shall provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools
whereby all children of this State may receive a good common
school education. 1115

Judicially,

it was questioned whether

the Illinois General Assembly had the vested power to alter
employment legislation in any manner, in order to carry out a
thorough and efficient system of free schools.

In Sloan v.

School Directors of District 22, the Illinois Supreme Court
responded that the General Assembly was

"allowed a

broad

discretion as to the manner in which to carry out their
duty.

n16

Similarly, in the 1937 Groves v. Board of Education of
Chicago 17 ,

the alteration of teacher employment legislation

was contested when SEC. 133 required compulsory retirement at
the age of seventy for Chicago teachers.

Although mandatory

retirement was a different issue than continued contracts, the
holdings of Grove and Sloan were in nature identical:

"The

length of term and the mode of appointment of school teachers
are under the control of the General Assembly. 1118
15

ILL. CONST. Art 8, Sec. I

(1946).

16sloan

v. School Directors of District 220, 373 Ill. 511,
26 N.E.2d 846 (1940).
17

Groves v. Board of Education of Chicago, 367 Ill. 91,
10 N.E.2d 403 (1937).

1sra.
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Perhaps these holdings were timely, in view of changes
in teacher employment legislation which would come forth after
Sloan and Groves would justify statutory alterations

1940.

that were to be later amended with the Teacher's Tenure Act of
1941.

Teacher Employment Policy in Chicago:

1900-1940

Chicago teachers were not subject to the same employment
statutes as those in the downstate school districts.

Rather,

the Chicago Board of Education was bound to the provisions of
SECS. 133 and 161, 19 of the Illinois Revised Statute in 1900
which read as follows:
Section 133: The BOARD OF EDUCATION Cin districts
of over 100, 000 inhabitants) shall have the power to
dismiss and remove any teacher for cause in the manner
provided in section 161 of this act.
Section 161: No teacher who has been, or who shall
have been, elected by said board of education, shall be
removed or discharged, except for cause upon written
charges which shall upon the teacher's written request, be
investigated and determined by said board of education,
whose action and decision in the matter shall be final •.•
Sections 133 and 161 afforded more rights for Chicago
teachers than its counterparts, SECS. 115 and 12.7 applicable
to

teachers

districts.

in board

of

director and board

of

education

Chicago teachers could be dismissed for cause

according to SEC. 133.

However, before the action to dismiss

was final, the teacher could request written charges of cause
for dismissal and an investigation into those charges by the
board of education.
19

Although teachers of Chicago had this

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Secs. 133 and 161 (1900).
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additional option, the effects on fairness were diminished.
Because cause was neither statutorily nor judicially defined,
its terms may have been subjective depending on the need of
the school board.
Seventeen years later, when the Otis Law was passed in
1917 ,2° the provisions of SEC.
teachers

and

appointment.

principals

133 were amended to provide

with

eligibility

for

permanent

Permanent appointment was based on three years

of satisfactory probationary service and merit.

Teachers were

still subject to dismissal by cause as outlined previously in
SEC. 161, but they had the additional option of being present
at

a

hearing

by

the

school

board,

to

be

represented

by

counsel, to offer evidence, and to present defense.
This statute was the first in Illinois to present the
opportunity

for

permanent

teaching

status,

and

to

give

teachers the right to a hearing if they were to be dismissed
from service.

Teachers in districts outside of Chicago were

not effected by enactment of the Otis Laws in 1917.
To summarize, between 1900 to 1940, judicially initiated
concepts basic to employment legislation for all Illinois
school districts came forth:
judicial

justification

for

Reasonableness of cause and
statutory

changes

in

teacher

employment (such as tenure itself).

Upon these concepts, a

framework

next

would

be

built

over

the

interpret the structure of tenure.
~Id.

at Sec. 133 (1917).

twenty

years

to
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Tenure in Downstate Board of Education School Districts:
1941-1961
Teacher

employment

rights

in

Illinois

were

first

legislated for Chicago teachers with the establishment of the
Otis Law in 1917.

This law was followed by provisions for a

continued

contract

districts

of

for

teachers

under 100, 000

in

board

inhabitants

of

in

education

1927,

and

for

teachers in board of director districts in 1937.
In 1941, the Teacher Tenure Act was passed, applicable
to teachers in board of education districts of under 500,000
inhabitants (formerly 100,000) under SEC. 136c of CHAP. 122 of
the

Illinois

statutes. 21

Revised

Teachers

in

board

inspector districts were not included in this statute.
status

was

retained with

a

of

Their

continued contract under the

provisions of SEC. 136b.
Section
teachers

the

136c,

or

the

opportunity

Teacher

to

be

Tenure

eligible

Act,
to

afforded

enter

into

contractual continued service after a specific probationary
period of employment.

As the legislature did not attempt to

define probationary, the courts construed its meaning.

The

Supreme Court of Illinois in Anderson v. Board of Education of
School District 91 in 1945, directed that the courts should
give

the word probationary

21

its

Id. at Sec. 136c (1917).

ordinary meaning.

Thus,

43
probationary meant "serving for trial. 1122
Probationary employment service, according to SEC. 136c,
must have been two consecutive years in duration, one of which
had to be subsequent to the date when the Teacher Tenure Act
took effect on July 21, 1941.

After 1941, the initial influx

of teacher dismissal cases, primarily dealt with determining
whether the teacher had fulfilled the probationary period of
employment.
One

such

case

involved

a

teacher

reinstatement to her former position.

who

had

sought

In Anderson, supra, 23

the teacher contended that she was entitled to contractual
continued
contracts.

service

as

she

had

taught

under

two,

one-year

She was contracted to teach on May 4, 1940 for the

1940-41 school year, and on May 2, 1941 for the 1941-42 school
year.

Anderson sought to apply the two, one-year contracts

towards fulfilling the probationary period.
In keeping with the ordinary meaning of the word "year, "
the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the length of "year"
meant a calendar year of twelve months.

Therefore, because

the teacher's contracts did not collectively amount to twentyfour months,

the court held that the required probationary

period was not met. 24

22Anderson v. Board of Education of School District 91,
390 Ill. 412, 61 N.E.2d 562 (1945).
23Id.
24Id.
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This requirement regarding the probationary period was
later

reaffirmed

in

1946,

when

it

was

ruled

that

a

superintendent did not meet the two-year period of probation
because he had served one year, eleven months and eight days
of the period of employment after the date of the Tenure
Act. 25

The

courts

remained

bound

to

the

twelve-month

calendar year interpretation handed down in Anderson supra,
until 1949 in the Illinois Revised statutes, when the word
"year" was amended to read "school term.

1126

Just as the words "year" and "probationary" from SEC.
136c were judicially interpreted in a literal fashion prior to
1949,

the probationary service period before and after the

enactment of the Tenure Act was also read in like manner.
Regarding this period of probationary service the Supreme
Court of Illinois in 1945 commented that:
A statute will be deemed to operate prospectively
only . . .
A teacher's employment is not automatically
probationary by virtue of the statute. 27
In

this

passage

the

court

meant

that

the

period

occurring prior to the date of the Act could not be counted as
probationary, unless there was a contract between two parties
stating these terms.
was

judicially

Service incurred after the Tenure Act

interpreted

as

being

automatically

25

Wilson v. Board of Education of School District No. 125,
et al., 394 Ill. 197, 68 N.E.2d 257 (1946).
26

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 136c (1949).

27

Anderson, 390 Ill. 412 (1945).

45

probationary, even if it wasn't specified in the contract.

A

1949 appellate court stated, regarding service incurred after
the Tenure Act, that:
All service by teachers under contracts entered into
after the effective data of the Tenure Act, even though
the contract is silent as to probationary period, is
intended and deemed to be probationary until such time as
the teacher acquires contractual continued service
status. 28
The determination of whether the probationary period
occurred before, or after the Tenure Act was critical for both
boards

and teachers.

Any teacher who

had

fulfilled

the

probationary period, would enter into contractual continued
service unless the board had decided to dismiss the teacher
for cause.

Section 136c stipulated that if the employing

board at the end of a teacher's second year of probationary
service had decided not to retain the teacher, they had to
notify the teacher first in writing, by registered mail at
least sixty days before the end of the probationary period,
providing the specific reasons for dismissal.

First-year

probationary teachers were not addressed in the Act in terms
of the employing board providing the teacher with any type of
notification or reason, if the teacher's contract was not to
be

renewed for

a

secondary probationary year of service.

Therefore, it was not mandated that boards of education serve
notice or reason to a teacher, if they wished not to renew the
teacher for the following school year.

28

Betebenner, 336 Ill. App. 448 (1949).
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Although SEC. 136c required teachers to fulfill a twoyear probationary term, before establishing eligibility for
contractual

continued service,

this

time period

could be

extended by the school district under certain circumstances.
Thus, when a teacher had not completed one year of full-time
teaching experience prior to the beginning of the probationary
period, the Tenure Act provided a school board with the option
of extending a teacher's probation for one additional year.
In order to extend this period the board had to give the
teacher written notice by registered mail at least sixty days
before the end of the two-year period. 29
Once a teacher was conferred with contractual continued
service, by statute, it ceased when the teacher reached the
age

of

sixty-five.

birthday,

employment

Following

the

was

determined

then

teacher's
on

sixty-fifth
an

annual

basis. 30
In spite of a teacher's entry into contractual continued
service, the employing board could remove or dismiss tenured
teachers for the causes provided in SECS. 123 and 136.

These

causes were:
Section 123 - ••• Incompetency, cruelty, negligence,
or other sufficient cause and
Section 13 6 - ••• Whenever in the opinion of the
board of education, he is not qualified to teach, or
whenever in the opinion of the board, the interests of the

29

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 136c {1941).

30Id.

47
school may require it. 31
In addition to dismissal

for cause,

SEC.

136c also

provided regulations for discharge of a tenured teacher due to
a decrease because of the discontinuance of a particular type
of

teaching

service.

In

such

a

situation,

the

statute

required that the teacher would receive a written notice of
dismissal by registered mail with a statement of honorable
dismissal and reasons thereof sixty days before the end of the
school term. 32
In Wilson, supra, the Supreme Court did not approve the
elimination of a position, where the real motive was to remove
the employee from his position without justification. 33

This

meant that public school districts could not use SEC. 136c
reasons

unless

those

conditions

specified

in

SEC.

136c

actually were present in the district.
If a tenured teacher was to be removed or dismissed for
any of the causes stated in SECS. 123 and 136, provisions for
discharge differed from those of a
force.

reduction

in teaching

When dismissing teachers for cause, SEC. 136c required

that dismissal would not become effective until the charges
were approved by a majority vote of all members of the board
of education and after a hearing, if requested in writing by

31

Id. at Secs. 123 and 136c (1941).

~Id.
3

at Sec. 136c (1941).

3wilson, 394 Ill. 197 (1946).
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the teacher within ten days after the service of

notice.~

The statute further provided that written notice of the
charges based on cause had to be given to the teacher at least
sixty days before the effective date of dismissal, which date
was between November first and the date of the close of the
term. 35

school

A 1959

case ruled that

such charges

for

dismissal had to be substantial.~
After the hearing was requested by the teacher it had to
be held and the decision rendered within a period of sixty
days.

No less than ten days could intervene between the date

of the notice for the hearing and the hearing itself.

The

hearing could be public at either the request of the teacher
or the board of education.

The Tenure Act of 1941, did not

specify the utilization of

an

Members

education,

of

the

board

of

impartial

hearing officer.

and

sometimes

superintendent of the school district, heard the case.

the

Though

there was not a provision for an impartial hearing officer,
the ACT did provide that the teacher could be present at the
hearing

with

counsel;

witnesses

could

be

cross-examined;

evidence and defense of the charges could be offered.
Section 136c further stipulated in 1941, that decisions
regarding the reasons or causes for dismissal by the board of

~ILL. REV.

STAT. Ch. 122, SEC. 136c (1941).

35Id.

~Lusk v. Community Consolidated School District 95, 20
Ill. App. 2d 252, 155 N.E. 2d 650 (1959).
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education were

to

be

considered

final,

unless

a

teacher

appealed to the county superintendent within a period of ten
days.

An appeal committee would then review the decision and

would either agree with the board of education or reverse the
decision of the board and reinstate the teacher. 37

Under the

Administrative Review Act, a judicial review of administrative
decisions regarding dismissal made by the appeal from the
county's office was added in 1945. 38

Duties of the county

superintendent's office in the appeal process,

were later

removed in 1953.
This action, of eliminating the county superintendent's
office from the appeal process, gave the school board more
adjucative authority.

Previously, there was another layer to

the appeal hierarchy, the county superintendent, before going
on to the administrative review.

Because that layer was

eliminated, a greater emphasis was placed on the school board
to resolve any problems at the local level.

Al though a school

board could not hear legal questions, the courts recognized
that school boards were the best forum for the resolution of
local

educational

problems. 39

It

was

recognized

in

the

Illinois Administrative Review Act, that:
A school board's findings regarding facts requiring
adjudication will generally not be reviewed unless opposed
to the substantial weight of the evidence, or unless
37

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 136c (1941).

38

Id. at Sec. 24-8 (1945).

39

Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1973).
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indicative of an abuse of discretion. 40
One

clause

in

SEC.

136c

that

conceded

boards

of

education a similar type of local control was remediability.
Regarding remediability, SEC. 136c stated in 1941 that:
Before service of notice of charges on account of
causes that may be deemed to be remediable, there shall be
given the teacher reasonable warning in writing starting
specificall~ the causes which if not removed, may result
in changes • 1
Remediability became a contended section of the Teacher
Tenure

Act

between

boards

and

teachers.

Although

what

constituted remediability was not defined, the intent of the
statute was to allow the teacher sufficient time to remedy
deficiencies which could result in charges of dismissal.
A leading Illinois Appellate Court decision pertaining
to remediability was in Meredith v.

Board of Education of

Community Unit School District No. 7 in 1955. 42

In Meredith,

the school board dismissed a tenured teacher who had refused
to

give

interests

up

his

of

outside

the

school

activities
required

and
it.

because

the

Meredith

best

was

an

agriculture teacher for the district and also sold fertilizer
and seed oats.
that

it

As his business expanded, the board believed

interfered

with

his

teaching

duties.

Meredith

contended that he should not have been dismissed, because the
40

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 110, Sec. 264 (1945).

41

rd. at sec. 136c (1941).

42Meredi th

v. Board of Education of Community Unit School
District No. 7, 7 Ill. App. 2d 477, 130 N.E.2d 477, 130 N.E.2d
5 (1955).
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cited causes were remediable.
he

be

given

notice

of

This would have required that

remediability,

thereby making

the

dismissal invalid. 43
The appellate court affirmed the decision in favor of
the board of education.

However,

the court did not make

reference to whether the cause was remediable, nor that the
board had acted in bad faith.

Rather the court, in a sense,

abdicated its judicial responsibility by holding that it was
a discretionary power of the board to determine whether causes
'

for dismissal were remediable.

It was also held in Meredith

that:
The best interest of the school of the district is the
guiding star of the board of education and for courts to
interfere with the exercise of the powers of the board in
that respect is an unwarranted assumption of authority and
can only be justified in cases where the board has acted
maliciously, capriciously, and arbitrarily. 44
This "guiding star" philosophy became the judicial rule
of thumb for court cases involving remediability of cause for
dismissal in the late fifties and early sixties.

The court,

in allowing boards of education to determine remediability of
cause as in Meredith, increased the adjudicative authority of
boards of education by leaving remediability open to their
interpretation.

No qualifying guidelines were delineated as

to what constituted best interests, rather this was left to
the board's determination.

It would have seemed plausible

52
that boards used this to their own benefit.
to

dismiss

teacher's

a

teacher

behavior

expediently,

irremediable

it

If a board wanted
could

declare

and avoid the more

consuming period of remediation.

the

time-

The legislative intent of

tenure was negated when boards did this, because teachers were
denied time to remediate which is a part of due process.
Broad discretionary power in determining remediability
paralleled the same authority that courts maintained should be
extended to the boards in the area of dismissal for sufficient
cause and when the interests of the school required it.

In

Joyce v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, an appellate
court again applied the same rule of board discretionary power
in 1945, when it said:
the rule to be deduced from the authorities is that where
the statute is silent as to what constitutes cause, the
right to determine the question is in the tribunal having
jurisdiction of the particular officer or employee. 45
The board when exercising its discretionary power in
determining what constituted sufficient cause for dismissal of
a teacher, could only be overruled by the court when there was
an abuse of that discretion or when the decision was without
substantial

evidence.

Muehle

v.

School

District

No.

38

reiterated this when the court wrote that:
School districts are vested by the Statute with
authority to dismiss a teacher for, among other specified
grounds, 'other sufficient cause.' It is axiomatic that
such authority vests a discretion trammeled only by proof

45

Joyce v. Board of Education of Chicago, 325 Ill. App.
543, 60 N.E.2d 431 (1945).
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of that discretion's abuse.~
The Administrative Review Act had also elaborated in
1945 on findings being prima facie true and correct:

"It is

only where its [the board of education] decision is without
substantial foundation in the record or manifestly against the
weight of the evidence that the same will be set aside. 1147
As with remediability, the courts did not specify the
definition of sufficient cause or the interests of the school.
The court's

lack of interpretation resulted

in boards of

education claiming almost an absolute discretion in this area.
Most any dismissal could be rationalized as sufficient cause
or when the interests of the school required it.

Further,

when

teaching

outside

factors

that

were

unrelated

to

performance entered into dismissal, the likelihood increased
that

the

factors

personal dislike.

were

motivated

by

political

With all dismissal cases,

reasons

or

the question

would be whether the courts were able to reach decisions that
recognized if discretionary abuse was present.
Between 1950 and 1961 Illinois court decisions regarding
teacher dismissal for sufficient cause or for the interests of
the school,

were fairly evenly split between favoring the

teacher or the board.

In those court cases where it was

decided in favor of the teacher,

it was either because the

46Muehle

v. School District No. 38, 344 Ill. App. 365, 100
N.E.2d 805 (1951).
47

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 110, Sec. 264 (1945).
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cause

was

found

to

be

remediable

or

because

insufficient evidence to sustain the finding.
and a

there

was

Insubordination

lack of discipline were found to be remediable in

1958, 48 while a 1961 appellate court decision ruled there was
insufficient evidence where a board was unable to show the
teacher's

failure

Hauswald v.

to

Board of

do

his

duty. 49

Education

of

In

the

matter

Community High

of

School

District No. 217, an insufficiency of teaching techniques was
found to be remediable and did not qualify for

immediate

dismissal under the "best interests" clause. 50
Dismissals of public school teachers in Illinois which
were upheld in favor of the boards of education were for such
reasons as the use of profanity in the classroom, involvement
in

a

job

outside

of

school, 51

uncontrollable

temper with

peers and students, 52 and public intoxication. 53
In Keyes v. Board of Education of Maroa Community Unit
48

smi th v. Board of Education of Community Unit School
District No. 1, 19 Ill. App. 2d 224, 153 N.E.2d 377 (1958).
49Allione

v. Board of Education of South Fork Community
High School District No. 310, 29 Ill. App. 2d 261, 173 N.E.2d
13 ( 1961) •
50

Hauswald v. Board of Education of Community High School
District No. 217, 20 Ill. App.2d 49, 155 N.E.2d 319 (1958).
51

Meredith, 7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1955).

52 Pearson

v. Board of Education of Alton Community Unit
School District No. 5, 12 Ill. App.2d 344, 138 N.E.2d 326
(1956).
53 scott

v. Board of Education of Al ton Community Unit
School District No. 11, et al., 20 Ill. App.2d 292, 156 N.E.2d
1 (1959).

55
School District No. 2 of Macon and DeWitt Counties, dismissal
of a superintendent for actively participating in fomenting
controversy,

conflict and dissention

in the

district and

failing to cooperate with the Board and his subordinate was
affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court.

It was made clear

in Keyes, supra in 1959, that the court was not concerned with
the wisdom of the decision of the Board, but only if whether
it was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. 54
Very specifically, in cases involving sufficient cause
and

the

interests

of

the

school,

the

Illinois

courts

consistently looked at the manifest weight of the evidence to
determine if the dismissal was valid.

Courts did not always

look at the politics involved in the dismissal though, despite
the premise that a board of education's discretionary abuse
would be overruled.
fomenting

Where a superintendent was dismissed for

controversy,

conflict,

and

dissention55

and

an

agriculture was dismissed for his outside fertilizer and seed
oat business, 56 the underlying reason was more than likely
political in nature.
Overall appellate and supreme court interpretations of
the Tenure Act,

between 1941 and 1961

generally conservative.

in

Illinois,

were

Because courts could not draw upon

54

Keyes v. Board of Education of Maroa Community Unit
School District No. 2, 20 Ill. App.2d 504, 156 N.E.2d 763
(1959).
55
5

wilson, 394 Ill. 197 (1946).

6Meredith, 7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1955).
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tested decisions,

interpretations of tenure statutes were

structured so as not to enlarge its scope.

In doing so, court

decisions more than often favored the boards of education
rather than teachers.
One issue that was not addressed in the Teacher Tenure
Act of 1941 was that of married female teachers, in relation
to dismissal from a teaching position.

The issue was whether

it was beyond the power of boards of education to adopt rules
that were not statutorily regulated.
In Templeton, et al. v. Board of Education of Township
High

School

District

No.

201,

et

al.

in

1948, 57

the

appellants, a group of married female teachers, not only felt
that their statutory rights were violated, but also that their
constitutional rights were denied.

District No. 201, in 1936,

had adopted the policy of not hiring married women.

Those who

were employed and already married were allowed to stay no more
than two years beyond that year.

The board agreed to hold

this policy in abeyance between 1938 and 1945, because the
United States was at war.

At the close of the war the board

decided to reaffirm and enforce its former policy that married
women could only be retained two years after marriage.

The

appellants filed for a writ of mandamus to reinstate them to
their former positions.
Court,
57

the

Illinois

On a direct appeal from the Circuit

Supreme

Court

dismissed

the

writ

of

People ex. re. Templeton et al. v. Board of Education
of Township High School District No. 201. et al. , 399 Ill.
204, 77 N.E.2d 200 {1948).

57
mandamus and intervened with a writ of certiorari.

Further,

the court stated in Templeton that:
The application of a statute does not present a
constitutional question so as to authorize a direct appeal
to this court.
The Appellate Court will not render a
judgment in conflict with a litigant's constitutional
rights. 58
The case was then transferred to the Appellate Court where it
was

found

"that it was within the power of the Board of

Education to have a rule against retention of married female
teachers and did not violate the Teacher's Tenure Law. 1159

A

rehearing was denied.
Earlier cases, such as Christner v. Hamilton in Oak Park
(1945) 60

and

McGuire

ruled similarly.
Etherton,

ruled

v.

Etherton

in

Murphysboro

{1944) 61

The Illinois Appellate Court in McGuire v.
that

it was

sufficient

cause

to

dismiss

married teachers and "that the School Act gives the power to
the

Board

to

adopt

and

enforce

all

necessary

rules

and

regulations for management and government of public schools of
their district."~
Thus, what was found was a situation where married women
were encouraged to join the workforce for a short period of

60

christner v. Hamilton, et al.,
N.E.2d 198 {1945).
61

324 Ill. App.

612, 59

McGuire v. Etherton County Superintendent of Schools,
et al., 324 Ill. App. 161, 57 N.E.2d 649 {1944).
62Id.

58

time,

under

conditions

socially acceptable.

where

being

a

working

woman

was

When the unwritten rules changed, many

of the women had been the new status and did not want to stop
teaching.

Many men served in the armed forces between 1940

and 1945, creating a manpower shortage in various areas of
employment.

As a

result,

there was a greater demand for
The fact of

females to fill this void in the labor force.

national need and patriotic service at this time removed many
of the social disabilities previously incurred by "working
women."

Immediately .after the war, there was a decrease in

the need for female employees, as it was more desirable to
employ men returning from the war.
Although many women ceased paid employment at the end of
World War II, a larger percentage continued in business and
industry than in any previous peacetime period of the United
States.

In 1950, 30 percent of the United States labor forced

was composed of women.
married.

Nearly half of the women employed were

Working mothers constituted more than twenty percent

of all mothers of children under eighteen.

While the total

labor force of the United States more than doubled between
1900

and

tripled. 63

1951,

the

number

of

working

women

more

than

This increase in the amount of working women,

coupled with a demand for greater equality, led to changes in
the types of jobs open for women in the latter part of the

63American

Peoples Encyclopedia,
Spencer Press, Inc., 1957.

Volume

20,

Chicago:

59

century.

The change in Illinois law was a

part of this

evolution,

where in 1949 the legislature established that

marriage was not a cause for dismissal from teachincf4 thus
making illegal any former contractual provisions against it.
One of the concerns about tenure for married female
teachers mentioned in a national survey to superintendents and
board members in 1939, was "that married teachers would hang
on for dear life to their jobs as long as it was possible, and
that would make it difficult for young graduates who were
seeking

employment. 1165

This

reason

seemed

arbitrary

and

without basis at best, but was indicative of the sentiments at
that time.

Of those surveyed, forty-four percent of the board

members and forty-two percent of the superintendents felt that
marriage

should be

a

cause for dismissal

of teachers

on

tenure.~

Perhaps Illinois did not legislate marriage as not

being

cause

a

for

dismissal

until

1949,

sentiments paralleled those nationally.

because

local

Also, in the fifties

there was a greater push for establishing teachers' rights in
general.
Tenure in Downstate Board of Director Districts:
1941-1961
The

terms

of

employment

for

teachers

in

board

of

MILL. REV. STAT. CH. 122, SECS. 6-36 and 7-13 (1949).
6511

opinions
on
Tenure:
Superintendents Committee on
Association, May, 1939, p. 6.
~Ibid.,

p. 22.

Schoolboards
Members
and
Tenure," National Education
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director districts, were not included with SEC. 136c either.
This district type

remained classified under SEC.

136b, 67

with a three-year continued contract for teachers, principals,
and superintendents following a two-year probationary period.
Employee dismissal procedures changed somewhat though,
due to the influence of the removal process in the new teacher
tenure provision.

Prior to 1941 notice of nonrenewal in SEC.

136b, was only provided to teachers receiving an honorable
dismissal.

After being amended, the Act mandated that it was

the duty of the board of school directors "on or before April
2 5 of each year in which any regular employment contract
expires to notify in writing said employee concerning his
reemployment or lack thereof."

Further, when a teacher was

not rehired, notification had to be accompanied by the written
reasons for the action.

Failing to issue a

constitute reemployment by default.~

notice would

The proviso of notice

in SEC. 136b, did not match the due process rights provided
teachers under the tenure statute,

SEC.

136c,

as board of

director districts were not required to provide a hearing or
an appeal process.

Additionally,

any form of security in

employment did not go beyond a three-year contract.
over the next twenty years, few amendments were added to
continued contracts and statutes pertaining to tenure.

The

language of SEC. 136b was refined to reflect greater clarity.
67 ILL.

~Id.

REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 136b (1941).
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some passages were deleted, while others were added.
Tenure Statutes for Chicago:

1941-1961

The tenure plan for Chicago teachers, first enacted in
1917,

was very similar to contractual

There

were

some

differences

continued service.

however,

in

the

technical

structure of both statutes.
The length of probationary service for Chicago teachers
under SEC. 186, was for three years as opposed to two years
for teachers in downstate board of education districts.
the terminology used for tenure differed in Chicago.

Also
Rather

than use the term contractual continued service for tenured
teachers,

SEC.

186

referred

to

tenure

as

a

permanent

appointment.

Permanent appointment was based on merit after

satisfactory

probationary

service.

The

appointment

was

automatic, if a teacher was not given notice of dismissal. 69
The actual dismissal of permanently appointed teachers
was based upon cause.

Other than being subject to the rules

of the Board of Education concerning conduct and efficiency,
cause was not defined.
Notification

and

hearing

for

Chicago

teachers

differed from those procedures specified in SEC.
teachers downstate.

In SEC.

also

136c for

136c, 70 charges would become

effective after being approved by a majority of the board
members.
69

After this approval, notice of these charges would

Id. at Sec. 186 (1941).

roid. at Sec. 136c (1941).

62

be served at least sixty days before dismissal.

A hearing

could be called if the teacher requested one within ten days
after having been served notice.
As opposed to SEC. 136c, teachers subject to SEC. 186
were served first with a thirty-day notice listing charges.
The written charges were then presented by the superintendent,
to be heard by the board or an authorized committee at the
expiration of the thirty days of the notice presented to the
teacher.

The teacher could be present at the hearing with

counsel, and evidence and defense could be offered.

Section

186 did not delineate whether cross-examination of witnesses
was permissible.

At this hearing the decision of the board

was

no

final,

with

allowance

for

appeal

to

the

county

superintendent.n
The two statutes, SECS. 136c and 186, had many common
elements.

But

at

the

same

time

there

were

some

wide

variances.

It would seem that teachers covered under SEC.

136c, were subject to a greater amount of procedural rights at
dismissal.
offering

There was a longer length of notice required.
sixty

days

in

SEC.

136c,

rather

than

By

thirty,

downstate teachers were allowed considerably more time to
prepare their own defense for a hearing.
Chicago teachers, in addition to having had less notice
of

hearing,

did

not

have

the

deficiency if it was remediable.
nld at sec. 186 {1941).

opportunity

to

correct

a

Remediability was not a

63
criterion included in SEC. 186. 72 Also, the tenure for Chicago
teachers did not include an appeal process.

A dissatisfied

teacher's only recourse, would have been to appeal judicially
to the circuit court.
Chicago tenure legislation had remained unchanged since
1917, when the Teacher Tenure Act was passed in July of 1941.
Chicago, at that time, was a political entity, separate from
the remainder of the state.

To include Chicago teachers in

the Teacher Tenure Act would have meant that downstate groups
would have had to work with the Chicago Teacher's Union, the
superintendent, the board members, the mayor and others from
Chicago to obtain passage of the Act.

Thus it would have been

easier to leave the statute for Chicago teachers separate,
rather than work together for one common status.
Summary
Employment legislation for teachers in Illinois public
schools

during

1900

and

1961,

was

characterized

by

the

establishment of a basic set of rules that allowed for job
security

and provided

fair

and consistent procedures

tenured teachers being dismissed.

for

The amount of job security

and the procedures to be used in the event of discharge
depended upon whether the teacher was probationary or tenured
and according to the size of the district in which the teacher
was employed.

In Donahoo v.

Board of Education of School

District No. 303, the Illinois Supreme Court commented on the
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difference between dismissal rights for probationary teachers
and tenured teachers when it commented that:
The legislature recognized the difference between
dismissing the probationer and the teacher who had gained
contractual continued service, by providing the more
elaborate and strict method for dismissal of the
latter. 73
Teacher tenure

legislation was

enacted

in 1917

for

Chicago teachers, 1941 for teachers in a board of education or
board

of

school

inspector

district

of

under

500,000

inhabitants, and 1967 for teachers in a board of directors
district of under 1,000 inhabitants.
Al though tenure regulations afforded more employment
rights

in

the workplace

for

teachers,

this

was

somewhat

overshadowed as school boards had vast powers in terms of
discretionary authority.

Some sections of the Tenure Act were

vaguely written and were open to broad interpretations.

The

court chose to strictly construe this passages, so as not to
enlarge the intent of the statute.

In this manner,

their

interpretations were more advantageous to boards of education
than teachers.

Although teachers had more employment rights

in the 1960's than they did in the early 1900's, the balance
of power between teacher and board still leaned toward the
board.
Chapter Four will continue to explore tenure legislation
and related case law involving dismissal of tenured teachers

73

Donahoo v. Board of Education of School District No.
303, et al., 413 Ill. 422, 109 N.E.2d 787 (1952).
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in the era of pre-reform, from 1961 to 1975.
issues

will

also

be

examined,

statutory provisions for tenure.

in

Constitutional

relation

to

Illinois

CHAPTER 4
THE HEARING OFFICER:

1961-1975

Introduction
Illinois tenure legislation developed during 1961 to
1975, whereby there was an emphasis placed on establishing
greater employment rights for tenured teachers at dismissal.
This was achieved through the addition of guidelines for an
impartial

hearing

officer

and

a

more

thorough

judicial

scrutiny over a school board's determination of remediable
versus irremediable cause for dismissal.

Further, "property"

and "liberty" interests as reviewed in the landmark decisions
made by the U.S. Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth 1
and Perry v.

Sindermann 2 ,

also effected teacher employment

rights in Illinois.
This chapter records statutory treatment of tenure in
Chicago and downstate Illinois public school districts from
1961 to 1975.

Additionally federal and state case law is

analyzed, focusing on the issues of:
1.

Remediability;

1

Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564, 33 L.E.2D 548, 92 S. Ct.
2701 (1972).
2 Perry

v. sindermann,
S . Ct . 2 6 9 4 ( 19 7 2 ) .

408 U.S.
66

593,

33 L.E.2D 570,

92
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Tenure

2.

status

of

Illinois

superintendents

and

principals; and
3.

"Property" and "liberty" interests.
Tenure in Downstate Districts:

The

most

prominent

change

in

1961-1975
Illinois

employment

statutes during the period between 1961 and 1975, was the
addition of an

impartial hearing officer to preside over

tenured teacher dismissal hearings.

According to SEC. 24-12

of the Illinois Revised Statutes of 1975, a hearing officer's
duty was

to render a

decision as to whether the tenured

teacher would be dismissed, unless the decision of the hearing
officer was to be reviewed according to the provisions of the
Administrative Review Act. 3
designated

that

school

Prior to 1975, the school code
boards

officiate

over

hearing

proceedings and make the final decision to dismiss a tenured
teacher.
Other requirements of SEC. 24-12 regarding the dismissal
hearing were that unless a teacher within ten days requested
in writing that no hearing be scheduled, the school board was
required to hold a hearing on the dismissal charges before a
disinterested hearing officer.

There were two qualifications

that the statute specified for the hearing officer:

(1)

accreditation by the National Arbitration Association; and (2)
nonresidency in the school district in which the teacher being
dismissed was employed.
3 ILL.

From a

list of five prospective

REV. STAT. CH. 122, Sec. 24-12 (1975).
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candidates provided by the Illinois State Board of Education,
the school board and the teacher or either of their legal
counsels would alternately strike a name from the list until
one name remained.
officer.

This person would then become the hearing

Final selection of the hearing officer had to be

completed within a five-day period.
Other duties accorded to the hearing officer by SEC. 2412 were to:
1.

Issue subpoenas.

A limitation of ten witnesses

could be subpoenaed on behalf of either the board
or the teacher.
taken

under

Testimony of witnesses was to be

oath

administered

by

the

hearing

officer.
2.

Keep a

record of the proceedings by employing a

reporter to take stenographic or stenotype notes of
all testimony.

Costs of employing the reporter

would be paid by the State Board of Education.
Although Illinois school boards no longer maintained
jurisdiction to make final dismissal decisions with the 1975
hearing officer legislation, it was still their responsibility
to fulfill certain statutory procedural steps.

Those steps

included:
1.

Determining if cause for dismissal was remediable
before making a motion to dismiss.
the

board

had

to

give

the

If remediable,

teacher

reasonable

warning in writing alerting the teacher that if the
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causes

were

not

removed

they

would

result

in

charges.
2.

Adhering to other distinct statutory guidelines:
a.

Approve motion to dismiss containing specific
charges by a majority vote of its members.

b.

Serve written notice to the teacher to be
dismissed at least twenty-one days before the
hearing date.

c.

Set hearing date no less than thirty days nor
more than sixty days after motion to dismiss. 4

In 1975,
statutorily

or

"reasonable warning"

had

not

been defined

judicially within any precise time

frame.

Remediability's definition generated judicial activity before
and after 1975, as boards of education broadly construed its
meaning in the absence of state statutory guidelines.

Two

major Illinois court decisions however, Meredith v. Board of
Education of Community Unit School District No. 7 (1955) and
Gilliland v. Board of Education (1977) attempted to clarify
the parameter of remediability. 5
Meredith, supra 6 was one of the first decisions which
directly addressed the issue of remediability.
Generally

during

the

period

immediately

after

the

4 Id.
5

Meredith, 7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1955); Gilliland v. Board
of Education of Pleasant View Consolidated School District No,
622, 67 Ill. 2d 143, 365 N.E.2d 322 (1977).
6Meredith, 7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1955).
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initiation of tenure, the Illinois court system held to the
doctrine of interpreting the tenure act so as not to expand
the act's meaning and burden the persons (referring to school
boards) subject to its operation. 7

Donahoo, supra, in 1951,

stated that
It has been repeatedly held by the Appellate Courts
of this state that the tenure law, being in derogation of
the common law and creating new liability, should be
strictly construed in favor of the Board of Education. 8
Maintaining that same posture, the appellate court in
Meredith ruled that in determining remediability of cause,
The best interests of the schools of the district is
the guiding star of the boards of education and for the
courts to interfere with the exercise of the powers of the
board in that respect is an unwarranted assumption of
authority and can only be justified in cases where the
board
has
acted
maliciously,
capriciously,
and
arbitrarily. 9
This philosophy of "best interests, 11 changed somewhat in
ensuing years, when several Illinois courts reiterated that
the judicial system was vested with the power of review to
test the exercise of the school board's discretion.

Thus, a

review by

board's

the

court

could

determine

whether

the

findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence 10
Without this judicial insulation, tenure laws would have had
7

Anderson, 390 Ill. 412 (1945).

8

Donahoo, 346 Ill. App. 241 (1951).

9Meredith,
10

7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1955).

Eveland v.
District, 340 Ill.
7 Ill. App.2d 477
District No. 4, 40

Board of Education Paris Union School
App. 308, 92 N.E.2d 182 (1950). Meredith,
(1955).
Werner v. Community Unit School
Ill. App.2d 491, 190 N.E.2d 184 (1963).
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no value as protection to teachers as boards would have then
been able to arbitrarily or without cause dismiss teachers.
courts looked for boards of education to prove that reasons
and causes for discharge existed, and also that the reasons
and causes were not remediable.

Thus, in the foregoing years

leading to the 1977 Gilliland decision, 11 what developed was
a

criterion for a

more strict judiciary examination of a

school board's determination of irremedial cause.
In keeping with the philosophy of an austere scrutiny
after Meredith,

the appellate court in Jepsen v.

Board of

(1958) 12 and

Education of Community School District No.

307

later

District

Werner

v.

Community

Unit

School

No.

4

( 1963) , 13 noted that
A cause not remediable is where damage has not been done;
• • • such that . • . any of the causes proved inflicted
damage or injury to the school, students or faculty. 14
In

the

Jepsen 15

case,

the

teacher

had

accused

the

principal of the school of knowingly permitting an ineligible
player to participate in a football game.

It was felt by the

appellate court, that the cause for dismissal, which was the

11

Gilliland, 67 Ill. 2d 143 ( 1977) .

12

Meredith, 7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1955). Jepsen v. Board of
Education of Community Unit School District No. 307, 19 Ill.
App.2d 204, 153 N.E.2d 417 (1958).
13

Werner, 40 Ill. App. 2d 491 ( 1963) •

14

Jepsen, 19 Ill. App.2d 204
App.2d 491 (1963).
15

(1958).

Jepsen, 19 Ill. App. 2d 204 ( 1958) .

Werner,

40 Ill.

72

teacher accusing the principal of concealing or attempting to
conceal

the

ineligibility

irremediable.

of

a

football

player

was

Accordingly, with the accusation having been

made, the damage to the school, students or the faculty was
done and could not have been repaired or remedied.
Werner's charges centered around alleged incompetency.
Contrary

to

the

Jepsen 16

decision,

an

Illinois

appellate

court ruled in Werner that the cause was remediable because:
There was nothing in the record to suggest damage or
injury was inflicted to the school, students or faculty
which could not have been remedied if complaints had been
made to Werner when knowledge of the causes first came to
the attention of her superiors and there was not evidence
or reason inferable from the record why plaintiff would
not have corrected the causes if her superiors had warned
her or made complaint about the causes. 17
Key to the two cases and those which followed was not so
much the damage the teacher's behavior could or did cause, but
whether the behavior could have been corrected upon being
warned.

Warning of causes which might become charges for

dismissal was considered by Illinois courts to be an important
right guaranteed to teachers through tenure law.
was

emphasized

repeatedly

regarding teacher dismissal.

in

different

This concept

court

decisions

Hauswald, supra, had stated that

"the right for teachers to be informed about causes that are
remediable and to have the opportunity to correct such causes

16Id.
17werner,

40 Ill. App.2d 49 (1958).
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go

to

the

heart

of

the

System. 1118

Tenure

In

teacher

dismissal cases, such as Werner, 19 where cause was judicially
deemed remediable, it was often because there was no evidence
that a plaintiff was given either repeated or single warnings
by a superior.

School boards frequently circumvented this

requirement of sending a warning notice by countering that the
causes were irremediable; thus a letter of warning to the
teacher

was

unnecessary.

Perhaps

in

recognizing

that

districts might have attempted to manipulate the guidelines to
their own benefit, the court in 1973, required that boards of
education make a determination of remediability and place it
on

record.

In Waller v.

Board of

Education

of

Century

Community Unit School District #100 it was required that:
On appeal, a record could not be properly reviewed
unless there was a showing that the Board made a
determination regarding remediability of causes and unless
its reasons are expressed in such a fashion that the
reviewing court can pass judgment on them. 20
This court felt it to be only reasonable that a record
be maintained by the Board disclosing its findings regarding
remediability,

because

the

law

itself 21

stated

that

the

Board's decision was subject to review.

In further justifying

its

education to

reasons

for

enjoining boards

of

record

18

Hauswald, 20 Ill. App.2d 49 (1958).

19

werner, 40 Ill. App.2d 491 (1963).

2°waller

v. Board of Education of Century Community Unit
District No. 100, 13 Ill. App.3d 1056, 302 N.E.2d 19 _(1973).
21Id.
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findings

of

remediability Waller,

supra

cited

Donahoo

in

stating that:
A board would not so readily dismiss when its reasons
therefor will be submitted to the bar of public opinion.
Such a statement would give the teacher a chance to know
his weaknesses and try to correct. 22
Because the school board in the Waller case failed to
make any finding on record regarding remediability of the
enumerated causes, the court felt that the board of education
was not in accordance with the intent of the law.

Therefore

this action prejudiced the rights of the teacher.

For this

reason the action of the board was reversed.
Illinois courts further ascertained in 1974, that it was
the sole responsibility of the board of education to serve
written
charges.

notice

of

warning

of

causes

which

might

become

A principal's letter of direction, as cited in the

Everett decision, would not serve as warning. 23
As remediability of cause continued to evolve judicially,
more stringent guidelines continued to develop for dismissing
a tenured teacher.
Education,~

Another such case was Glover v. Board of

in 1974.

The appellate court in Glover added

that
If defects which are remedial in nature continue for
a long enough period of time and where the teacher refuses
~Donahoo,

413 Ill. 422 (1952).

23 Everett

v. Board of Education of District 101, 22 Ill.
App.3d 594, 317 N.E.2d 753 (1974).
24 Glover

v. Board of Education, 2 Ill. App.3d 1053, 316
N.E.2d 534 (1974).
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or fails to
irremedial.
With

the

remedy

them,

inclusion

of

they

have

been

Jepsen, 25

the

considered

Werner26

and

Glover27 decisions, the following questions emerged to apply
against

a

school

board's

decision

to

designate

cause

as

irremediable:
1.

Was

the

dismissal

in the

best

interests

of

the

schools of the district? (Meredith--1955) 28
2.

Was

the

determination

arbitrary,

malicious,

of

or

irremediable

capricious

in

cause
intent?

(Meredith--1955)~

3.

Did any of the causes inflict damage or injury to
the

school,

students

or

faculty?

(Jepsen-1958) 30

and Werner--1963) 31
4.

Did

the

causes

continue over a

which were

remediable

in

nature

long period of time or did the

teacher fail to remedy them? (Glover--1974) 32

25Jepsen, 19 Ill. App. 2d 204 (1958).
26werner, 40 Ill. App. 2d 49 (1958).
27Glover

'

21 Ill. App. 3d 1053 (1974).

28Mered i th, 7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1950).
29Id.
30Jepsen, 19 Ill. App. 2d 204 (1958).
31 Werner
32 Glover

'
'

40 Ill. App. 2d 49 (1958).
21 Ill. App. 3d 1053 (1974).
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Gilliland33 , an Illinois Supreme Court decision in 1977
[and later Aulworm34 in 1977 and Grissom35 in 1978] confirmed
the aforementioned points in its holding with the following
criterion for determining remediability: 36
1.

Did any of the causes damage the students, faculty
or school?

2.

Could the conduct resulting in that damage have
been corrected had the teacher's superiors warned
him or her?

3.

Did the cause go uncorrected over a long period of
time?

Uncorrected causes for dismissal which were

originally

remediable

in

nature

irremediable if continued over a

can

become

long period of

time.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Gilliland, 37 stressed that
although it is the responsibility of the board of education to
determine irremediability of cause; the board's findings are
not immune from judicial review.
statutory
33

and

judicial

If after being applied to

criterion,

a

teacher's

cause

for

Gilliland, 62 Ill. App. 3d 143 ( 1977) .

34

Aulworm v. Board of Education of Murohvsboro Community
Unit School District 186, 67 Ill.2d 434, 10 Ill. Dec. 571,
N.E.2d 1337 (1977).
35

Grissom v. Board of Education of Buckley-Loda Community
School District No. 8, 75 Ill.2d 314, 26 Ill. Dec. 683, 388
N.E.2d 398 (1979).
36

Gilliland, 62 Ill. App. 3d 143 (1977).

37

Ibid.
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dismissal was found by the court to be remediable; a board's
findings would be against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In turn the board would then have lacked jurisdiction to
proceed with the dismissal,

as the teacher was not given

written warning to remediate and an opportunity for correction
as stipulated by SEC. 24-12 of the Illinois School Code. 38
Between 1962 and 1976, Illinois courts found lack of
discipline to be remediable in nature.

Such was the case in

Wells v. Board of Education of Community School District No.
221 39

(1967),

Yesinowski

v.

Board

of

Education

of

Bryon

Community Unit School District No. 226 40 (1975), and Paprocki
v.

Board

of

District No.

Education
156

of

(1975) 41

McHenry

Community

High

However in Gilliland42 ,

School
lack of

discipline and control were found to be irremediable because
discipline was

combined with a

continuous in nature.
incompetency,

number of

causes

and was

Gilliland's misconduct, which included

cruelty,

and

negligence;

also

damaged

her

students and the school itself.

38 ILL.

REV. STAT. CH. 122, Sec. 24-12 (1975).

39

Wells v. Board of Education of Community School District
No. 221, 85 Ill. App.2d 312, 230 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
40

Yesinowski v. Board of Education of Byron Community
School District No. 226, 28 Ill. App.3d 119, 328 N.E.2d 23
(1975).
41

Paprocki v. Board of Education of McHenry Community High
School District 156, 31 Ill. App.3d 112, 334 N.E.2d 841
(1975).
42

Gilliland, 67 Ill. App.3d 143 (1977).
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Other causes in dismissal cases of tenured teachers
which were held to be irremediable included a teacher's:
1.

Noncooperation with the staff and principal; 43

2.

Willful

and

intentional

violation

of

a

board's

request not to attend a conference unrelated to the
school curriculum; 44
3.

Uncontrollable temper outbursts over a period of
two years ; 45

4.

Uncorrected
methods,

etc.

lack

of

cooperation,

disciplinary

over an extended period of time; 46

and
5.

Failure to follow a sabbatical leave plan for fulltime study. 47

These dismissal cases shared some commonalities, which
lead to causes being upheld by courts as irremediable.

One

such common factor was ample documentation by the board of
education of warning notices sent regarding remediable defects
in teaching and sufficient time to remedy said shortcomings.

43

Robinson v. Community Unit School District No. 7,
Ill. App.2d 325, 182 N.E.2d 770 (1962).

35

44

Yuen v. Board of Education of School District No. U-46,
77 Ill. App.2d 353, 222 N.E.2d 573 (1966).
45

Kallas v. Board of Education of Marshall Community Unit
District No. C-2, 15 Ill. App.3d 450, 304 N.E.2d 527 (1973).
46McLain

v. Board of Education School District No. 52, 36
Ill. App.2d 143, 183 N.E.2d 7 (1962).
47

Pittel v. Board of Education School District 111, 315
N.E. 179 (1974).
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Exemplifying this concept was McLain v. Board of Education,
School District No. 52. 48

The appellate court in McLain ruled

that repeated oral and written notifications over a period of
months of teaching deficiencies and opportunity to remedy
indicated compliance with statutory requirements.

Under such

circumstances it then became common for courts to rule those
causes irremediable, when a teacher was repeatedly warned to
correct teaching faults and failed to comply with directives.
In Kallas v.

Board of Education of Marshall Community Unit

School District No. C-2, the court recognized that although
temper outbursts were remediable; it did not entitle them to
remain remediable forever. 49
A third type of commonality leading to irremediability
of cause were those which the court had decided were injurious
to either the students,

faculty,

or school.

A teacher's

absence and intentional violation of a Board rule was held to
be a loss to the students, in Yuen v. Board of Education of
School District No. U-46, as damage was done and could not be
remedied. 50
As previously stated

in the second chapter of this

dissertation, that the provisions for remediability of cause
in SEC. 24-12, only applied to teachers who had entered into
contractual continued service.
48McLain,

"Teacher" according to the

36 Ill. App.2d 143 (1962).

49

Kallas, 15 Ill. App.3d 450 (1973).

50

Yuen, 7 7 I 11 . App . 2 d 3 5 3 ( 19 6 6) .
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aforementioned section,

was defined as any or all

school

district employees regularly required to be certified under
laws relating to the certification of teachers.

Further, in

order for "teachers" to enter into tenure he or she must have
been

"employed

for

a

probationary

period

of

two

school

terms. 1151
These

terms

administrators

were

did

not

excluded

succinctly
and

contractual continued service.

thus,

Rather,

specify

not

that

eligible

for

the nature of the

requirements in SEC. 24-12 for tenure were broad.

Within the

definition of "teacher," regularly certified employees could
have

included

administrators

such

as

superintendents

or

principals, in addition to teachers.

Probationary service was

not limited to time spent teaching.

Instead this service was

described as being "employed" for two school terms.
Since tenure laws were initiated in Illinois in 1941,
administrative eligibility for contractual continued service
was judicially debated.
Education

of

School

In the case of Wilson v. Board of
District

No.

126,

in

1946, 52

the

petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to be reinstated as
superintendent from the position of principal and to have paid
to him his previous salary.

Wilson based his claim upon the

fact that because he had been employed as superintendent from
July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942 and July 1, 1942 to June 30,

51
52

ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 122, Sec. 24-12 (1989).

Wilson v. Board of Education of School District No.
126, 3394 Ill. 197, 68 N.E.2d 257 (1946).
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1943,

he

had

fulfilled

continued service.

the

requirements

of

contractual

Thus, because the board of education did

not abrogate his rights under the Teacher Tenure Law,

he

should have been reemployed for the next fiscal year as a
superintendent.

It was ruled by the Illinois Supreme Court

that Wilson was ineligible to receive tenure, as he had not
completed two calendar years of probationary service.

However

the issue of whether superintendents were within the statutory
definition of "teacher,"
In 1956,

~as

not discussed.

the appellate court in McNely v.

Board of

Education held that a superintendent who did no teaching was
still included within the provisions of the Teacher Tenure
Law.

Legislative policy regarding this decision was stated

accordingly:
It was the policy of the legislature to include within the
Teacher Tenure Law only those employees required to be
certified. It stated that policy by the simple method of
defining teachers for the purposes of the act, as 'any or
all school district employees' regularly required to be
certified under laws relating to the certification of
teachers • . . the certification of superintendents and
public acquiescence therein, coupled with the later
statutory enactment in conformity thereto, leaves us with
the inevitable conclusion that superintendents are . . .
'teachers' within the definition of the Teacher Tenure
Law. 53
Therefore, as relayed by this appellate court, the term
"teacher" included superintendents, principals, supervisors,
and

teachers.

All

of

the

aforementioned

were

district

employees regularly required to be certified under the laws
53McNely

v. Board
N.E.2d 63 (1956).

of

Education,

9

Ill.2d

143,

137

82
and

teachers .

All

of

the

aforementioned

were

district

employees regularly required to be certified under the laws
relating to the certification of teachers.
Another appellate court decision in 1967 agreed with the
McNely54 decision and further stated that superintendents only
have tenure as a teacher.
School District No.

In Lester v. Board of Education of

119, 55 the question was not whether a

superintendent was within the scope of the Tenure Act; but
whether he had tenure as a superintendent.

Justification for

the ruling was based on the fact that superintendents were
"teachers" according to tenure law and acquired tenure as a
certified

employee

permitted

boards

of

of

the

school.

education

position the teacher was

to

Because
assign

qualified to

a

tenure

teacher

fill;

a

law
to

a

board was

justified in this type of action as long as it wasn't in the
nature of chicanery or subterfuge designed to subvert the
provisions of the law.
Six years after the Lestor decision, separate statutes
were added to the state code which referred to principals and
superintendents under a multi-year contract with a
district.

These

statutes,

SECS.

10-23.8

and

school

10-23.8a,~

required that any principal or superintendent upon accepting

55 Lester

v. Board of Education District No.
N.E.2d 893 (1967).
56 ILL.

119,

230

REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Secs. 10-23.8 and 23.8a (1977).
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16. 57
This action then left boards of education with two types
of options for employment of principals or superintendents.
With the first option, as outlined in SECS. 24-11 to 24-16, 58
a principal or superintendent could sign yearly contracts and
become

eligible

teacher.

for

contractual

continued

service

as

a

If the district wished to dismiss a superintendent

or principal, it would have to follow those afforded teacher
under the tenure act.

As stipulated by SEC.

24-11, 59 this

status would not prohibit a school board from transferring a
principal or superintendent to another position which the
principal or superintendent was qualified to fill and to make
such

salary

adjustments

as

the

board

deemed

desirable.

Additionally if salary adjustments were uniform or based upon
some

reasonable

classification,

notice

and

hearing

of

a

reduction in status would be unnecessary.
Sections 10-23.8 and 10-23.8a & b, offered the second
option of employment of superintendents and principals for
boards

of

education

of

public

schools

in

Illinois.

Superintendents or principals could be offered multi-year
contracts of no less than three years, except for a person
serving as superintendent for the first time in Illinois.

In

this case, a superintendent or principal could be offered a
57 Id.

ssid.
59Id.

at Secs. 24-11 to 24-16 ( 1977) .
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contract two years in length.~
provision of SEC.
position.

10-23. 8,

superintendents, under the

could not be moved to another

However principals, under the 1986 amendment of

this same section, could be reclassified upon written notice
and reasons.
principal.

A private hearing could be requested by the
If unsatisfied with the results of the private

hearing, a principal could also request a public hearing.

If

a board of education decided not to renew the contract of a

.

superintendent or principal,

it must have provided written

notice with reasons and a hearing.

Notice must be given by

April 1 of the year the contract expired; while a hearing must
be provided ten days after the receipt of notice,

upon a

superintendent's or principal's request.
The

difference

between

the

two

options

lies

with

procedures for nonrenewal.

With a one-year contract under

tenure

complicated

law,

it

was

less

not

superintendent or principal if he was tenured.

to

rehire

a

Nonrenewal of

a first-year probationary superintendent or principal only
required notice, while the second-year probationary required
notice and reasons.
These

procedures

superintendents
contract.

or

contrasted

principals

hired

with
under

those
a

for

multi-year

Whenever a school board wished to nonrenew under

these circumstances; notice, reasons, and hearing had to be
accorded to the employee.
60

In the author's opinion, it was

Id. at Secs. 10-23.8 and 12.23.8a (1975 & 1973).
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actually easier and less costly for districts to hire on oneyear contracts, because it would give districts the options of
bypassing the hearing process.

However, as opposed to the

strict judicial scrutiny of remediation of cause where new
guidelines
tenured

made

it more

teachers;

this

The two

education.

difficult

for

legislation

boards
favored

statutory provisions

boards with two possible alternatives,

to

dismiss

boards

of

provided school

whereby the school

district would choose the most beneficial.
Tenure Statutes in Chicago:

1961-1975

Although Chicago tenure law was legislated well before
the

rest

downstate

of

the

state

districts

in

in

1917 , 61

other

Chicago

tenure

lagged

developments.

behind
The

original Teacher Tenure Act of 1941 62 for downstate teachers
included provisions for remediability.

It was amended to

include administrative review in 1945 63 and the use of an
impartial hearing officer in 1975.M

Remediability of cause

was legislated for Chicago in 1963, 65 while administrative
review was added in 1963 and the impartial hearing office in

61Id. at Sec. 161 (1917).
62Id. at Sec. 136c (1941).
63Id. at Sec. 136c (1945).
Mra. at Sec. 24-12 (1975).
65Id. at Sec. 34-85 (1963).
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1979. 66

Additionally,

Chicago

administrators

were

not

eligible for the provisions of the multi-year contract of
SECS.

10-23.8

to

10-23.Sb.~

According

to

SEC.

34-85, 68

principals in Chicago maintained eligibility for tenure as
principals until 1989.

Downstate principals under SEC. 24-

12 69 were never conferred tenure as a principal.
Aside from the delays in tenure legislation between
Chicago and downstate districts, differences in wording of the
aforementioned passages were minimal.

Regarding remediability

of cause, SEC. 24-12 (Downstate) read:
Before setting a hearing on charges stemming from causes
that are considered remediable, a board must give the
teacher
reasonable
warning
in
writing,
stating
specificalltc the causes which if not removed, may result
in charges . 0
Whereas, SEC. 34-85 (Chicago) stipulated that:
Before service of notice of charges on account of causes
that may be deemed to be remediable, the teacher or
principal shall be given reasonable warning in writing,
stating specificallt the causes which, if not removed, may
result in charges. 7
The two passages vary in terms of when cause must be
deemed remediable.

66

It was further required upon downstate

Id. at Sec. 34-85 (1979).

67Id. at Secs. 10-23.8
68

&

Sa (1975

&

1973).

Id. at Sec. 34-85 (1979).

69 see Secs. 136c (1941) to 24-12 (1989).
70Id. at Sec. 24-12 (1979).
71Id. at Sec. 34-85 (1979).
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districts

24-12, 72

through SEC.

setting a hearing.

that this

be done

before

Scheduling a hearing date was hingent upon

an approval by the board of education of a motion containing
specific charges and a twenty day period where the teacher
could request a hearing not be held.

In holding a literal

interpretation of this clause for downstate public school
districts, a board of education then had up to twenty days
after the approval

of the motion containing the specific

charges for dismissal; in which to determine remediability of
cause.
Remediability of cause under guidelines for dismissal of
tenured Chicago teachers
determined

before

in SEC.

service of

34-85,

notice

of

had to have been
charges.

Before

serving notice of charges a motion had to be approved by the
board

of

education;

which

contained

written

charges,

specifications and a request to the State Board of Education
to schedule a hearing.

Written notice had to be sent to the

teacher or principal no more than ten days after the adoption
of such motion.

Thus, the board of education had the period

of teacher's tenured employment plus ten days,
determine remediability of cause.

in which to

This meant in actuality

that downstate districts had ten more days to deem cause as
being remediable.n
Al though there were many dismissal cases of tenured
nid. at Sec. 24-12 (1979).
nrd. at sec. 34-85 (1979).
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teachers pertaining to remediability of cause from downstate
public school districts between 1961 and 1975, petitions to
the court on this same subject from dismissed Chicago teachers
were virtually absent.

Szkirpan v. Board of Education of the

city of Chicago74 in 1975, was the only case to reach the
appellate court.

However it did not deal

remediability,

rather it was based on a supposed technical error on the part
of the board.

Other dismissal cases dealt with teachers of

probationary status, who sought tenure. 75
'

Statutory

differences

regarding

hearing

officer

legislation for dismissal of downstate and Chicago tenured
teachers, were similar to those of remediability of cause.
Variations
timelines.

in

the

law

consisted

Section 24-12

of

(Downstate)

different

procedural

designated that the

district's school board set the hearing date no less than
thirty and no more than sixty days after the approval of the
motion of charges. 76
officer make the

It

final

required

decision regarding dismissal

with

As with remediability of cause the

reasonable dispatch.
timelines

further stated that the hearing

by

SEC.

34-85n

(Chicago)

74 Szkirpan

v.
Board of Education of the
Chicago, 29 Ill. App.3d 1047, 331 N.E.2d (1975).

were
city

more
of

~Thomas v. Board of Education of the Citv of Chicago,
40 Ill. App.2d 308 (1963).
Lipp v. Board of Education of
the City of Chicago, 470 F.2d 802 (1972).
Provus v. Board
of Education, 11 Ill. App.3d 1058 (1973).
76 ILL.

REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 24-12 (1979).

nid. at Sec. 34-85 (1979).

89

narrowly defined.

It

indicated that the State Board of

Education schedule a hearing (as opposed to the local school
board in downstate districts) no less than twenty and no more
than forty-five days after the date the State Board notified
the involved parties of the selected hearing officer.

As

opposed to the hearing officer making the final decision with
reasonable

dispatch

as

required

in

24-12, 78

SEC.

the

previously mentioned section specified that hearing officers
make

final

decisions

conclusion

of

the

principal

would

within

hearing
be

as

forty-five

days

to

the

dismissed.

whether

from

the

teacher

or

Legislation

regarding

administrative review for the two district types were alike,
as both were based on the Administrative Review Act of CH.
110, SEC. 264, of the Illinois Revised Statutes.
Content
varied,

analysis

the wordings

indicated

that

although

of teacher dismissal

timelines

procedures

downstate and Chicago areas had a general likeness.

for
Most

interesting is the fact that teacher tenure law was legislated
for Chicago public schools in the early 1900's.
rights

inherent

to

the

dismissal

process

for

Yet other
teaches

contractual continued service in downstate areas,

in

(such as

remediation of cause or the impartial hearing officer) were
amended for Chicago teachers at a much later date.

Albeit

that the writer does not have the answers as to why this has
happened;

an

examination

into

roid. at Sec. 24-12 (1979).

the

reasons

for

these

90
occurrences could be another topic of future study.
Constitutional Considerations:

Property and

Liberty Interests
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights apply only if
one was deprived of "life, liberty, or property."

In order

for a public school teacher in Illinois to claim that there
was a denial of due process in relation to job security, it
must be shown that there was a deprivation of one of these
rights.
Two major U.S. Supreme Court cases, Board of Regents v.
Roth79 and Perry v. Sindermann80 delivered rulings pertaining
to liberty and property interests and teacher dismissal.
Board of Regents v.
terms.

Roth,

In

the supreme court defined these

It commented on property interests in the following

manner:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for
it.
He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it . . . . Rather, they are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law--rules or understandings that secure certain
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits. 81
In

__
Roth , 82

the

teacher

involved

who

was

an

assistant

professor at a state university, was informed that he would
79

Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) .

80

sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).

81

Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).

82Id.
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not be rehired after his first year of employment.

The court

concluded that because he had no tenure rights to continued
employment and there was no state statute or university policy
that secured his

interest in reemployment or created any

legitimate claim to it, he did not have a property interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment sufficient to require
his superiors to give him a hearing when they declined to
renew

his

employment

Sindermann,
creation

stated

of

contract.

that

"property

other

The

courts

factors

may

interests"

for

in

Perry

influence

v.
the

teachers. 83

It

prescribed that if the customary practices of the institution
created a de facto tenure system, then a teacher would have a
property interest in reemployment and would be entitled to due
process protection prior to dismissal.

When Miller v. School

District No. 167, reached the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1973; it was held that as a matter of Illinois
state

law,

a

second-year

probationary

teacher

claim

of

entitlement to his position was not a property interest. 84
As

a

cross-reference

another
because

federal

see

also,

court holding.

Illinois

statutes

Shirck v.
This

required

Thomas

court
that

(1973),

decided
a

that

second-year

probationary teacher be given reasons for dismissal, it did

83

sindermann, 408 U. s. 593 ( 1972) .

84Miller

(1973).

v.

School District No.

167,

354 F.

Supp.

922
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not create a property interest. 85

An Illinois Supreme court

decision in 1976, also ruled that an evaluation clause in a
collective bargaining agreement, was not sufficient enough to
create

a

property

required to hold a

interest

where

a

school

district

due process hearing for a

teacher upon dismissal.

was

non-tenured

Thus, what was brought forth between

the federal and state level, was that notice on non-renewal at
the completion served upon a second-year probationary teacher
does

not

constitute contractual

employment.

entitlement

to

a

further

Moreover, it does not give right to a due process

hearing.
Another constitutional issue upon which Roth expounded
was that of

11

liberty. 11

In interpreting

11

liberty, 11 the Supreme

Court stated that:
Liberty is not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life . . . .
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing to him, notice and opportunity to be heard are
essential. 86
In Lipp v.

Board of Education of City of Chicago87 a

federal court case in 1972, it was recognized that "liberty"
takes in two interests of a public employee:

the protection

of his good name, honor and integrity; and the protection of

85

shirck v. Thomas, 486 F.2d 691 (1973).

86

Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).

87

Lipp v. Board of Education of City of Chicago,
F. 2d 802 (1972).
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his

freedom

to

opportunities.
did

not

advantage

of

other

employment

Illinois tenure law according to SEC. 24-12

require

probationary

take

a

hearing

teacher

be

who

given

was

to

to

a

be

second-year
dismissed.M

Nevertheless, if the cause for dismissal would deprive a nontenured

teacher

of

a

liberty

right,

a

hearing

would

be

tenure

in

constitutionally required.
Summary
Immediately

preceding

the

initiation

of

downstate areas, legislative action tended to favor teachers
by setting forth basic sets of guidelines regarding procedures
involving dismissal.
this trend continued.

During the period between 1961 and 1975,
Tenure issues of importance were those

regarding the hearing officer, remediability of cause,

and

constitutional requirements of "liberty" and "property".
Chapter Five will analyze statutory and case law in the
area of dismissal of tenured teachers, between 1976 and 1989.
Previous concepts, such as remediability and federal rights,
will be further researched as well as those which pertain to
the upcoming segment of time.

MILL. REV. STAT. CH. 122, Sec. 24-12 (1975).

CHAPTER 5
TEACHER DISMISSAL AND THE REMEDIATION PROCESS THE CONSULTING TEACHER:

1976-1989

Introduction
This

chapter

concludes

the

author's

analysis

of

statutory and case law of the dismissal of tenured teachers in
public schools of Illinois.

In the first thirty-four years

after the Teacher Tenure Act 1 was introduced, remediation of
cause was the most litigated issue involving dismissal of
tenured teachers.

Until 1975, school boards not only made the

initial

as

judgment

to

whether

cause

was

remediable

or

irremediable, but also ascertained the final decision in the
dismissal hearing.

After 1975, a statutory amendment to the

Illinois Revised Code removed the board's power to adjudicate
dismissal hearings.
to

an

impartial

This responsibility was then transferred

hearing

officer

appointed

by

the

state.

However, boards of education still had the authority to make
the

pre-hearing

irremediability.

determination

of

remediability

or

An Illinois Supreme court interpretation in

Gilliland, supra in 1977, decided upon criteria which must be
adhered to when specifying remediability of cause.
1

Gilliland, 68 Ill.2d 143 (1977).
94

Gilliland
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stipulated the following two-prong test for remediability:
1.

Did any of the causes damage the students, faculty,
or school?
Could the conduct resulting in that damage have
been corrected had the teacher's superiors warned
him or her? 2

2.

Additionally, this decision also stated that uncorrected
causes

for

dismissal

which were originally

remediable

in

nature; could become irremediable if continued over a long
period of time.

Gilliland did not define though, the length

of this period of remediation.

It was not until 1985, that

the legislature standardized this timeframe,

by specifying

that remediation shall be one calendar year in length. 3
This

chapter

will

further

discuss

the

issues

of

remediation and tenure legislation related to downstate school
districts and Chicago from 1976 to 1989.

Court decisions

which generated from legislated tenure statutes during this
time will also be analyzed.
Tenure in Downstate Districts:

1976-1989

Tenure's original purpose was to provide teachers with
the right to an unlawful, arbitrary, and capricious dismissal
by a school board. 4

In keeping with this intent, the Tenure

Act was continuously amended to intervene in any possible
arbitrary

interpretations by boards

of

education.

Early

amendments to tenure law in the 1940s through the 1960s,

3 ILL.
4 Id.

REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Art. 24A-5 (1985).
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constituted clarifications to vague statutory passages.

Later

changes in the 1970s and 1980s, focused on additional criteria
to prevent abuses of the law.

In 1975, one such example of

additional criteria was designating that an impartial hearing
officer would be the responsible party for final decisions in
dismissal hearings of tenured teachers.

(Before 1975, boards

of education were charged with that responsibility.)
Another type of criteria was legislated on September 2 5,
1985, thereby adding a requisite of a one-year remediation
plan which,

according

to

ART.

24A-5

of

Illinois

Revised

Statutes, would be commenced and developed by the district
thirty days after completion of an evaluation rating a teacher
unsatisfactory. 5
correct

The remediation plan was to be designed to

deficiencies

which

were

deemed

remediable.

Additionally, ART. 24A stipulated the following criteria:
1.

Three people were to participate in the remediation
plan - the teacher rated unsatisfactory; a district
administrator who met the requirements of ART. 24A3 ;6 and a consulting teacher. 7

2.

The duration of the remediation was to be for a
period of one-year.

3.

Evaluation was to take place quarterly during the
one-year period,

conducted

5

Id.

6

Id. at Art. 24A-3, Par. F (1986).

7Id.

at Art. 24A-5 (1985).

by

the

participating

97

administrator.

(Unless an applicable collective

bargaining agreement provided otherwise.)
4.

Consulting teachers could not evaluate the teacher
undergoing

remediation.

role

to

was

remediation

A consul ting

participate

plan

and

to

in

teacher's

developing

provide

advice

the

to

the

teacher rated "unsatisfactory" on how to improve
teaching

skills

remediation
precluded
under

and

successfully

plan.

from

SEC.

Consulting

testifying at
24-12,

complete
teachers

dismissal

for

the
were

hearings

teachers

rated

"unsatisfactory" with whom they advised. 8
5.

Any teacher who completed the one-year remediation
plan

with

a

"satisfactory"

or

better

would

be

reinstated to a schedule of biennial evaluation.
SEC. 24-12 added that:
The hearing officer shall consider and give weight to all
of the teacher's evaluations written pursuant to SEC. 24A. The hearing officer within reasonable dispatch, shall
make a decision as to whether or not the teacher shall be
dismissed and shall give a copy to both the teacher and
the school board. 9
As the legislation was not worded clearly in its intent,
several questions could arise upon review.
1.

Whether

ART.

24-A

required

At issue might be:
school

boards

"initiate" or develop a remediation program;

8 Id.
9

at Art. 24-12 (1986).

Id. at Art. 24A-5 (1986).

to

98
2.

Whether ART.
discharge

24-A stipulated that there can be a

of

remediation

teacher

a

with

the

who

Board

had

acting

undergone
in

only

a

ministerial capacity;
3.

Whether remediable causes for dismissal which had
not been determined according to ART. 24-A through
a

district evaluation rating

need

to

be

subject

to

a

of unsatisfactory,

one-year

remediation

process;
4.

Whether

a

hearing

provided

by

SEC.

24-12

was

automatic under circumstances where a teacher had
undergone remediation.
Powell v.
District

Board of Education of the City of Peoria,

150 and

Illinois

state Board of

Education, 10

an

Illinois Appellate Court decision in 1989 addressed these
first two issues in its opinion.

As to whether ART.

24-A

required school boards to "initiate" or develop a remediation
program it held that "district administrators are permitted
under the statute to develop the individual teacher's remedial
plans under the overall supervision of the school board. 1111
It was noted by this court that a 1989 amendment to ART. 24-5,
PAR. F 12 specifically permitted administrators to develop and
10

Powell v. Board of Education of the City of Peoria,
District 150 and Illinois Board of Education, No. 3-89-0084
(Ill. App.3d Sept. 23, 1989).
11 ILL.
12 Id.

REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Art. 24-12 (1986).
at Art. 24A-5 ( 1986) .
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commence remediation plans.
the

district

would

be

Prior to 1989, PAR. F stated that

responsible

for

commencement

and

development of a remediation plan. 13
Powell also addressed a second issue as to whether there
can be a discharge of a teacher who has undergone remediation
with

the

Board

acting

in

only

a

ministerial

capacity. 14

Meaning, could a teacher be dismissed without the Board being
directly involved in the teacher's termination of employment?
It was held by the court that once a remediation program had
been instituted by the administration, the local board had no
more responsibility or control over firing or retention of the
affected teacher.

With the inclusion of the

remediation

process of ART. 24A in 1985, a new clause was amended to SEC.
24-12 which required that a hearing officer was responsible
for reviewing the teacher's evaluations written pursuant to
ART. 24A and for deciding whether or not a teacher shall be
dismissed.

In its rationalization, the court stated that

The new legislation reflected the legislature's
intent to remove from the jurisdiction of local boards the
ultimate
responsibility on a
termination decision
followin~
remediation
to
a
disinterested
hearing
officer.
Al though the court

in

Powell,

addressed

two

issues

regarding the 1985 remediation legislation, to date it is the
only

court

case

litigated

at

the

13

Id. at Sec. 24-12 (1986).

14

Powell v. Board of Education.

appellate

level,

and
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therefore other issues have not yet been articulated.

Other

possible questions may arise due to the additional passages of
1985 through 1989 regarding remediation.
the

question

provide a

it was

statutorily

necessary

to

one-year remediation plan for all causes deemed

remediable.
teacher

of whether

Unanswered would be

One possibility would be the occurrence of a

deficiency

which

rather than evaluations.

was

cited

through

observations,

Accordingly the behavior was not

deemed as unsatisfactory, but was categorized simply as cause
for dismissal
School Code.

according to SEC.

10-22. 4 16 of the Illinois

Thus, the prevailing question would be if the

district in this type of situation was legally bound to the
one-year remediation period before contemplating dismissal?
Another remaining question pertains to the hearing.

In

one paragraph of SEC. 24-12 (1989), it stated that "No hearing
upon the charges is required unless the teacher . • . requests
in writing of the board that a hearing be scheduled • .

. 1117

On the other hand, the clause regarding remediability within
SEC. 24-12 stated that the decision as to whether a teacher
who had undergone remediation will be dismissed,
decided by the hearing officer at the hearing. 18
by the Powell decision.) 19

From the author' s

16

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, 10-22.4 (1986).

17

Id. at 24-12.

18Id.
19

Powell v. Board of Education.

would be
(Also held

perspective,
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these two clauses conf 1 ict each other.
statutory

or

case

issues.

Only

However, no additional

law presently exists

further

judicial

to

scrutiny

address
or

these

legislative

amendments will provide clarification.
Historically,
within tenure law.
forty-nine

years

Illinois frequently changed provisions
Alterations to tenure law during its first

of

existence,

occurred

as

a

result

of

arbitrary dismissals or the potential for abuse in removing
teachers.

In 1977,

the Illinois Supreme Court had voiced

concern that "a procedure whereby a local board function as
prosecutor, witness, judge, and jury was too susceptible to
abuse."

Gilliland as quoted in Board of Education of Valley

View v. File in 1980, added that:
Perhaps as a result of these concerns, SEC. 24-12 was
amended by Public Act 79-561 in 1975. Under the provision
of this act, the local school board's hearing functions
were placed with an impartial hearing officer. 20
Implementation of a standardized remediation period, was
yet another means to remove the likelihood of prejudices
within tenure law.
length from a

Before 1985, remediation periods varied in

few months to a

few years.

proviso of consistent guidelines for a
though,

Even with the

remediation period

broad legal interpretations were invoked elsewhere

within tenure law.

Remediability of cause remained unclear

and was exposed to arbitrariness due to a lack of statutory

20

Board of Education of Valley View Communitv Unit
School District No. 365U v. File, 89 Ill. App.3d 11·32, 412
N.E.2d 1030 (1980).
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directives

on

the

A

subject.

statutory

definition

of

remediableness of cause has been absent from SEC. 24-12 21 (at
that time SEC.

136c)

vested

consideration

this

since tenure's inception,
to

boards

of

as the Act
education.

Gilliland22 did provide a two-prong test for remediability in
a 1977 supreme court decision.
debated at length however,

Each prong has been legally

by either school boards or the

teacher to be dismissed.
This debate was evidenced by the amount of case law
generated in the area of remediability.

Of the thirty-five

dismissal cases which were analyzed regarding remediability
from the period between 1976 to 1989, {The thirty-five cases
represented Illinois appellate and supreme court decisions
regarding dismissal of tenured teachers in downstate public
school districts.) remediability was at issue in twenty-five.
These twenty-five decisions reflected case law pertaining to
teacher deficiencies in four areas:
1.

Mismanagement of classroom discipline or excessive
disciplinary methods - Eleven cases; 23

21 ILL.
22
23

REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 136c {1941).

Gilliland, 67 Ill. 2d 143 ( 1977) .

Board of Education of Minooka Community Consolidated
School District No. 201 v. Ingels, 75 Ill. App.3d 335, 394
N.E.2d 69 (1975). Board of Education of School District No.
131 v. State Board of Education, 99 Ill.2d 111, 457 N.E. 2d
435 (1983).
Combs v. Board of Education of Avon Center
School District No. 47, 498 N.E.2d 806 {1986).
Fender v.
School District No. 25, 37 Ill. App.3d 736, 347 N.E.2d 270
{1976).
Gilliland, 67 Ill.2d 143 {1976).
Grissom v. Board
of Education of Buckley-Loda Community School District No.
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2.

Immorality - Six cases ; 24

3.

Illness - Five cases; 25

4.

General incompetency - Three cases; 26

(There were forty-three cases in all analyzed.

Eight cases 27

!!., 75 Ill.2d 314, 388 N.E.2d 398 (1979).
Lowe v. Board of
Education of the City of Chicago, 76 Ill. App.3d 348, 395
N.E.2d 59 (1979).
Rolando v. School Directors of District
No. 125, 44 Ill. App.3d 658, 358 N.E.2d 945 (1976). Stamper
v. Board of Education of Elementary School District No. 143,
141 Ill. App.3d 884, 491 N.E.2d 36 (198~).
Swayne v. Board
of Education of Rock Island School District No. 5, 45 Ill.
App.3d 35, 358 N.E.2d 1364 (1977).
Welch v. Board of
Education Bement Community Unit School District No. 5, 45
Ill. App.3d 35, 358 N.E.2d 1364 (1977).
24

Board of Education of Tonica Communi tv Hiqh School
District No. 360 v. Sickley, 133 Ill. App.3d 921, 479 N.E.2d
1142 ( 1985) •
Eckmann v. Board of Education of Hawthorn
School District, 636 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1986). Fadler
v. Illinois State Board of Education, 153 Ill. App.3d 1024
(1987). McBroom v. Board of Education, Ill. App.3d 463, 494
N.E.2d 1191 (1986).
Morelli v. Board of Education, Pekin
Community High School District No. 303, 42 Ill. App.3d 722,
356 N.E.2d 438 (1976).
Reinhardt v. Board of Education of
Community Unit School District No. 11, 61 Ill.2d 101, 329
N.E.2d 218 (1975).
25

Board of Education School District No.
151 v.
Illinois State Board of Education, 154 Ill. App.3d 375
(1987). DeBarnard v. State Board of Education, 123 Ill. 153
(1988).
Deoliveira v. State Board of Education, 158 Ill.
App.3d 153 (1987). Friesel v. Board of Education of Medinah
School District No. 11, 79 Ill. App.3d 460, 398 N.E.2d 637
(1979).
Gould v. Board of Education of Ashley Community
Consolidated School District No. 15, 32 Ill. App. 3d 808,
336 N.E.2d 69 (1975).
26

Board of Education,
Niles Township High School
District No. 219 v. Epstein, 72 Ill. App.3d 723, 391 N.E.2d
114 ( 1979) •
Aul worm, 67 Ill. 2d 434 (1977).
Gilliland, 67
Ill.2d 143 (1977).
27

Board of Education of St. Charles Community Unit
School District No. 303 v. Adelman, 97 Ill. App.3d 530, 423
N. E. 2d 254 ( 1981) .
Board of Education of School District
No. 131 v. Illinois State Board of Education, 82 Ill.-App.3d
820, 403 N. E. 2d 277 ( 1980) .
Board of Education of Valley
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entailed decisions based on technical errors on the part of
either the school board of the hearing officer.)
Poor classroom management or excessive disciplinary
techniques represented the major area of concern to school
boards.

Thirty-one percent of the analyzed cases pertaining

to remediability during this period involved dismissal under
these circumstances.

What was significant was the fact that

the quantity of this type of dismissal case had increased 350
percent,

over those same type of dismissal cases litigated

between 1961 and 1975.

There were three discipline related

cases appealed to the courts between 1961 and 1975, as opposed
to eleven from 1976 to 1989.
Cases

in

this

category

were

either

classified

as

behaviors where there constituted poor classroom management or
excessive abuse of discipline.

In appellate court cases in

Illinois where a teacher was cited as overdisciplining his or
her students it was held to be irremediable in nature when:
1.

The behavior displayed by the teacher exhibited
continuing patterns of cruelty and violation in his

View Community Unit School District No. 365U, 89 Ill. App.3d
1132 {1980).
Glover v. Board of Education of Macon
Community Unit District No. 5, 62 Ill.2d 122, 340 N.E.2d
(1976). Hansen v. Board of Education of School District No.
65, 150 Ill. App.3d 979, 502 N.E.2d 467 (1986).
Koerner v.
Joppa Community High School District No. 21, 1453 Ill.
App.3d 162, 492 N.E.2d 1017 (1986).
Massoud v. Board of
Education of Valley View Community District No. 365-U, 97
Ill. App.3d 65, 422 N.E.2d 236 (1981).
Neal v. Board of
Education, School District No. 189, 56 Ill. App.3d, 371
N.E.2d 869 (1978).
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relationship with students; 28
2.

The punishment inflicted was so severe as to have
been deemed unreasonable; 29

3.

No amount of warning given to the teacher could
have remedied the damage done to the student. 30

An Illinois Supreme Court decision on this subject in
1983, Board of Education of School District 131 v. State Board
of Education31 regarded a teacher who had taught seventeen
years

in the purported district without a

record.

blemish on his

In the last six months of his career, the teacher

Robert Slavin,

had difficulty in controlling a

fourth-grade students.

few of his

In the course of disciplining them he

was at times, in the opinion of the school district in which
he was employed, too rough in handling them.

For example, he

grabbed and shook one of his students leaving black and blue
marks; while another encounter with a different student left
scratches.

In a separate occasion, a student was thrown on

top of his desk hard enough to make the desktop fly up.
behavior was rendered as remediable.

This

It was rationalized by

the Illinois Supreme Court that:
1.

None of the students
medical attention;

28 Fender,
29

missed

school

or

sought

37 Ill. App.3d 736 (1976).

Welch, 45 Ill. App.3d 35 (1977).

30Id.
31

Board of Education School District 131, 99 Ill.2d 111
(1983).
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2.
3.

Serious injury was not incurred to any students;
The board of education failed to demonstrate that
conduct could not have been corrected had the
teacher been warned. 32

In reaching its decision of remediability, the court
applied the two-prong test of Gilliland.

The first prong of

this test posed the question of whether the conduct caused
damage to the student, faculty,
the

bar,

court

significantly

responded

damage

any

of

or school.

that
the

the

In the case at

conduct

students.

did

None

of

not
the

students missed school or sought medical attention as a result
of the discipline administered by Slavin.

Also as opposed to

where the teacher's misconduct extended over four years in
Gilliland, 33

Slavin

never

encountered

difficulty

with

students during seventeen years of teaching until the last six
weeks.

This conclusion was similarly reached by the appellate

court in 1979,

in Board of Education of Minooka Community

Consolidated School District No. 70 v. Ingels, when it was
stated that:
Except where aggravating circumstances are present, the
proof of momentary lapses in discipline and order or a
single day's lesson gone awry is not sufficient to show
cause for dismissal of a tenure teacher. Yet where brief
instances and isolated lapses occur repeatedly there
emerges a pattern of behavior which, if deficient, will
support the dismissal of a tenured teacher. 34
This

concept

of

continuing

patterns

of

classroom

DGilliland, 67 Ill.2d 143 (1977).
34

Board of Education of Minooka Community Consolidated
School District No. 70, 75 Ill. App.3d 335 (1975).
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mismanagement and additionally,

serious forms of abuse to

students; were upheld as being irremediable in other course
cases prior to the Slavin decision.

In Fender3 5 in 1976, the

behavior displayed by teacher continued over a
several years.

period of

Fender's abuse of students was more severe

than that of Slavin' s.

One offense was that of Fender holding

a student by her hair and slapping her face ten to thirteen
times, causing the child's mouth to bleed.
Rolando v. School District No. 125, in 1975, was also
more serious. 36

Rolando used an electronic cattle prod to

discipline unruly sixth-grade students.
Education,

(1979),

In Lowe v. Board of

the teacher beat the students within a

curtain rod, an extension cord, and a club made out of balsa
wood nailed together and wrapped with masking tape. 37

Welch

v. Board of Education (1977), presented a situation where a
teacher paddled a student a second time because the first
didn't hurt. 38

The severity of the second paddling warranted

that the child's mother bring him to the doctor.
Gilliland' s 39

second part

of

the

two-prong

analysis

asked whether the conduct could have been corrected had the

~Fender,

37 Ill. App.3d 736 (1976).

36

Rolando, 44 Ill. App.3d 658 (1976).

37

Lowe, 76 Ill. App.3d 348 (1979).

38welch,
39

45 Ill. App.3d 35 (1977).

Gilliland, 67 Ill.2d 143 (1977).
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teacher been warned.

Again in "the Slavin case", 40 the court

felt

Slavin

that

although

instituting discipline

exercised

poor

it was nevertheless

should have been called to his attention.

judgment

when

remediable and

Further, although

the board of education had an expert witness that Slavin's
behavior was irremediable in nature, the court felt that the
board did not demonstrate that the conduct could have been
corrected had the teacher been warned.
Two important points generated from "the Slavin case" in
Board of Education School District 131 v.

State Board of

Education41 in 1983, to use a measure of whether a discipline
related deficiency was remediable or irremediable.
the harm caused by the mode of discipline.

One was

It was considered

slight and thus remediable, if there were no serious injuries
to the students and if the student did not miss school or seek
medical attention.
were

Also, it was remediable if the behaviors

isolated incidences as opposed to continuous over a

period of time.
Discipline cases after "Slavin" held to this rule of
thumb.

In Swayne v. Board of Education of Rock Island No.

41, 42 it was held remediable when a teacher had placed a boy
inside a closet as punishment and later hit the same child in

40

Board of Education of School District 131, 99 Ill. 2d
111 (1983).

42

swayne, 45 Ill. App.3d 35 (1977).
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front of the class with a yardstick three times across the
buttocks.

Before being hit, the child was instructed to pull

down his

jeans and bend over and grab

underwear remained on.

his

ankles.

His

Using "Slavin" as a baseline the court

felt the offense to be less serious than that of "Slavin."
two

other

teachers

discipline

were

related

given notice

cases, 43

to

remedy

both

in

1986,

deficiencies

In
the

before

dismissal when their classroom discipline was unruly.
Disciplinary mismanagement was only one possible type of

.

teacher incompetency.

With other types of behaviors which

could be labeled as "incompetency" the courts had held to the
same tests as in Gilliland44 and in the "Slavin" case.

The

courts in particular looked at whether the cited deficiencies
could have been corrected with warning.

For example,

in

Aulworm v. Board of Education of Murphysboro, 45 the teacher's
dismissal notice contained eight grounds for dismissal.

Among

these grounds were such charges as lack of preparation for
teaching duties and failure to comply with stated policies of
the Board of Education.
to

failure

to

In actuality these charges amounted

submit lesson plans,

attendance

forms,

and

student recognition reports, not conducting a student musical,
and

inadequately performing his

43

combs, 498 N.E.2d
App.3d 884 {1986).

806

football-coaching

{1986).

44

Gilliland, 67 Ill. 2d 143 ( 1977).

45

Aulworm, 67 Ill. 2d 434 ( 1977) .

Stamper,

duties.

141

Ill.
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However

using

the

criteria

from

Gilliland, 46

the

courts

considered these behaviors as remediable as they could have
been corrected with prior warning.
Although

there

were

many

dismissal

cases

involving

improper discipline, in other areas of incompetency there were
few.

Throughout the history of Illinois tenure, the courts

have not come out with a definition of incompetence.

Rather,

they have dealt with the subject on a case-by-case basis.

In

each, the courts have ruled by judging according to uniqueness
of

facts

and

applicability

analysis for remediability.

to

the

Gilliland47

two-prong

So perhaps, the test is not in

whether a behavior should be proven as being incompetent, but
rather did it qualify as first, not being against the manifest
weight

of

the

evidence

and

second,

remediable

under

the

guidelines of Gilliland. 48
Also relevant to cases of incompetence was the time
period over which the purported behaviors occurred.

In cases

where the deficiencies were continuous in nature, the court
was more apt to hold the behavior to be irremediable.
before Gilliland49 in 1962,

Well

the McLain decision had stated

that •
Even though separate items may appear remediable, when the
46 Gilliland, 67 Ill. App.2d 143 (1977).
47Id.
48rd.
49Id.
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teacher for more than a year repeatedly refuses to accept
any recommendations and persists in her rigid ways, there
must come a time when they can no longer be re~arded as
remediable being apparently a character defect. 0
Other than discipline related,
litigated

in

incompetency.

the

upper

court

there were few cases

levels

which

dealt

with

This phenomena could be reasoned to the courts

reservation in specifying a true definition of incompetency.
With only guidelines as to remediability provided by state
statute at hand, the area of incompetency may have been viewed
as vague as to what actually can constitute a

basis

for

dismissal.
As related by Donald Rosenburger and Richard Plimpton in
the Journal of Education,
Administrators are often unclear about the way in which
courts will dismiss.
They have had no experience in
gathering pertinent evidence, presenting it, or defending
a point of view in a court of law.
Add this to public
relations and staff relations, implications of making
decisions on competence, and inaction is often the
result. 51
School

districts

would

attempt

under

the

guise

of

incompetency to dismiss teachers on illness related charges.
However in 1975,

it was amended into the Illinois Revised

Statutes in SEC. 10-22.4 that "temporary mental or physical
incapacity to perform teaching duties was not a cause for
dismissal.

1152

5°McLain,

However,

SEC.

24-13

of the Illinois School

36 Ill. App. 2d 143 (1962).

5111

Teacher Incompetence and the Courts," Journal of Law
and Education (July 1975): 470.
52

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 10-22.4 (1975).
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Code allowed a school board to define temporary illness and
incapacity. 53

Section 24-13 also reiterated SEC. 10-22.4 in

that a teacher's tenure "is not affected by absence caused by
temporary

illness

or

temporary

incapacity

as

defined

by

regulations of the employing board. 1154
According to the Appellate Court in Board of Education
School District No. 151 v.
197,

school

Illinois State of Education55 in

boards could not define temporary

incapacity out of existence.

illness or

A board of education's power to

define was not absolute, rather it was limited by SEC. 1022. 456 of the School Code.
Teachers also tried to use the temporary illness clause
to their own advantage,

as did boards of education.

One

teacher in 1987, 57 when it became apparent that she would be
dismissed

for

deficiencies

cited by

the

school

board

as

incompetency, submitted a note from her doctor that she was on
active medical treatment and needed time off.

The board of

education granted her sick leave, but still sought dismissal
for incompetency.

~Id.

This decision, DeOl i veira v. State Board of

at Sec. 24-13 (1975).

54Id.
55 Board of Education School District No.
App.3d 375 (1987).

151, 154 Ill.

56 ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 10-22.4 (1975).
57 DeOliveira, 158 Ill. App.3d 111 (1988).
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Education, 58

was

upheld

by

both

the

trial

and

appellate

courts that the teacher failed to establish that she suffered
from

temporary

mental

incapacity

during

the

remediation

period; thus preventing her from substantially performing the
tasks required of her.
DeBarnard v.
that a

In another similar case in 1988,

State Board of Education, 59 it was determined

teacher had not proved by a

preponderance of the

evidence, that her depression prevented her from complying
with the notice to remedy.
Immorality was another cause for dismissal that was open
to interpretation.

In defining the nature of immorality, the

courts looked toward the Gilliland60 test for remediability.
A teacher in Fadler v. Illinois State Board of Education61 in
1987, was dismissed by reason of immorality for squeezing the
breast of a young girl and for placing his hand inside the
undergarment of a nine-year old girl.
court

noted

the

following

in

In its holding, the

regards

to

dismissal

for

immorality:
1.
2.

The behavior could not be remedied by a simple
written warning.
The board is not required to wait until such
conduct causes clinical adverse effects on students
before
finding
the
conduct
immoral
and
irremediable, while other students may be subject
to future abuse.

59 DeBarnard,

123 Ill. Dec. (1988).

~Gilliland,

67 Ill.2d 143 (1977).

61

Fadler, 153 Ill. App.3d 1024 (1987).
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3.

Plaintiffs conduct was not only harmful to
individual student-teachers relationships, but was
equally harmful to the reputation of and faith in
the faculty and school. 62

With

respect

to

the

second

part

of

the

two-prong

analysis of remediability in Gilliland, 63 the court felt that
it

was

not

an

appropriate

test

to

apply

to

involving alleged immoral conduct of a teacher.

situations
Contrary to

the court's opinion, it could be argued that if a teacher was
asked to refrain from improper touching that he would do so.
However, the court in response, felt that a more appropriate
focus was not whether the conduct could have been corrected by
a warning, but rather the effects of the conduct on the child
and the school could not be corrected.
An earlier decision,
District 202~

McBroom v.

Board

of Education

(1986), also took the posture of the second

prong of Gilliland65 being inappropriate to apply to cases
where the teacher was to be dismissed for immorality.
case at bar,
charges.
student' s

In the

the cause for dismissal related to criminal

It was alleged that a teacher stole a check from a
locker and cashed it.

In the court's view it

stated:
If it only took a promise never to engage in the improper
conduct again, it is clear that it would be very

~Gilliland,

67 Ill.2d 143 (1977).

~McBroom, Ill. App.3d 463 {1986).

MGilliland, 67 Ill.2d 143 (1977).
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difficult, if not impossible to satisfy the second prong
of the remediability test.~
One

type

of

charge

regarding

immorality

problematic were pregnancies out of wedlock.
education

in

Reinhardt

v.

Board

of

which

was

The board of

Education

of

Alton

Community Unit School District Number 1167 in 1975, charged
that a teacher had become pregnant will unmarried and that she
had falsely told her principal that she was pregnant.

They

also alleged that Reinhardt's conduct was a cause of notorious
discussion
however,

and

adverse

public

comment.

It was

unclear,

to the Illinois Supreme Court what evidence was

presented and what it was they may or may not have been
contrary to the evidence.

Because the court could not judge

whether the findings were constitutionally proper, there could
be no judicial review.

It was to be noted that the trier of

facts before administrative review in this case, was the board
of education.

Although it was tried at the Supreme Court

level in 1975, the antecedents of the case began in 1972,
before hearing officer legislation.
In a more serious blunder by a board of education, a
jury awarded $3.3 million to a teacher dismissed for similar
reasons in 1986.

Surrounding this case, Eckmann v. Board of

Education of Hawthorn School District, 68 was the fact that

~cBroom,

Ill. App.3d 463 (1977).

67Reinhardt,
68 Eckmann,

61 Ill. 2d 101 (1975).

636 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
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the teacher supposedly was raped by a hitchhiker while she was
returning from a retreat from a convent.
devout Catholic in a

Also, Eckmann was a

heavily Lutheran town.

report the rape to the police.

She did not

Further, she was "counseled"

by her principal who was also the superintendent

(also a

devout Catholic and opposed to abortion) that she had no cause
to worry about loss of her effectiveness as a teacher.

She

gave birth in July, 1986 and then decided to raise her child
as a single parent.

Eckmann was fired the following January

primarily on the ground of immorality.

Testimony at the

hearing consisted of doubts as to whether she was really
raped.

In part, the board's action was their response to an

ad hoc group of parents urging Eckmann's dismissal.
Eckmann appealed administratively claiming violation of
her constitutionally protected rights.

In a subsequent trial

it was purported by the board of education, that Eckmann never
really fit in.

Again, the reasons were unclear to the court.

As the trial progressed the Board added other charges not
linked to her pregnancy dealing with events from six months to
three years old.

The court, regarded these charges as a "post

hour smoke screen. 1169
Eckmann' s

rights were identified by the court as "a

choice to conceive and raise her child out of wedlock without
unwarranted state intrusion; 1170 thus invoking the doctrine of
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privacy.
districts
immorality

Commentators on this issue have noted that school
have

had

because

difficulty
of

an

unwed

in

promoting

pregnancy, 71

grounds
as

it

is

fundamental right protected by the U.S. Constitution. 72

of
a
As

noted in Mount Healthy v. Doyle,~ a U.S. Supreme Court case,
"once a conduct moves to the fundamental right status, a board
must demonstrate a compelling need to dismiss the teacher. 1174
A question to

be

raised

is

if

such decisions

insulated by protective fundamental

right;

should be

thus depriving

local school boards of the authority to dismiss unwed pregnant
teachers.

The answer to this question

cannot be

according to local values in school districts.

sought

Rather, it

should be embodied in further judicial scrutiny.
Tenure in Chicago:
Although

Chicago

tenure

1976-1989
statutes

pertaining

to

remediability of cause, the hearing officer, etc. were amended
into law after statutes of the same nature for downstate

71

See "Eckmann v. Board of Education of Hawthorn School
District: Bad Management Makes Bad Law," Journal of Law and
Education (Spring 1988): 281-297.
Amendment XIV of the U. s. Cons ti tut ion reads in part
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the law." The right to bear children would be a liberty
issue.
72

~Mount Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
74Id.

(1977).
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areas, both Chicago and downstate public school districts were
regulated by the one-year remediation clause in SEC. 24A-5 in
1986.~

In 1989, as part of school reform legislation, the

Chicago remediation period was changed from that of a one-year
period to forty-five days. 76
to political

This change could have been due

pressures placed on

legislators

through the Chicago Principal' s Association.

by

lobbying

At the time, the

coalition of principals sought legal action because the reform
legislation stripped principals of tenure and place them under
'

a

three-year contract governed by each

council.

Perhaps

in

a

compromise

individual
agreement

school
between

legislators and the Chicago Principal Association, removal of
tenure rights were traded for a shorter remediation period of
unsatisfactory tenured teachers.
Components other than the specified remediation period
and the consulting teacher in Chicago tenure provisions of
SECS.

34-84 and 34085 remained for the most part unchanged

after 1977.
from

SEC.

Compulsory retirement at age seventy was removed
34-84

in

1989, n

as

were

any

relating to tenure rights of principals.

prior

provisions

Principals were

placed under a three-year performance contract.

Removal from

this contract had to have been based on cause.
Aside from the aforementioned changes to Chicago tenure
~Ill. REV.
76

STAT. Ch. 122, Art. 24A-5 (1986).

Id. at Art. 24A-5 (1989).

nid. at Sec. 34-84 (1989).
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provisions, there were also additional changes to procedures
regarding a hearing.
by SEC.

In 1979, the school board was required

34-84 78 to notify the State Board of Education to

schedule

a

hearing

in

it

notion

to

dismiss.

Hearing

notification was changed for both downstate and Chicago in
1988, 79 when

it was

amended that no hearing was

required

unless requested by the teacher within ten days after the
receiving notice.
scheduled.

Therefore, a hearing was not automatically

The burden of initiating a hearing now rested with

the teacher.
a hearing,

It was possible that a teacher may not request
thus benefitting both the school board and the

state by eliminating the high cost associated with hearings.
Emphasis on case law for dismissal of Chicago tenured
teachers differed from those of the downstate areas in the
years between 1976 and 1989.

Of the cases litigated in

Chicago over this thirteen year period, the following areas
were noted:
1.

Procedural errors - Three cases 80

2.

Dismissal

78 Id.
79
80

or

reassignment

of

principals

Two

at 1989.

Id. at Secs. 24-12 and 34-85 {1988).

Jones v. Hannon, 58 Ill. App.3d 504 {1978).
Littin
v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 72 Ill. App.3d
889 {1979).
Wolfe v. Board of Education of the Citv of
Chicago, 171 Ill. App.3d 298, 324 N.E.2d 1177 (1988).
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cases81
3.

Remediableness of cause - Four cases 82

4•

Other reasons - Two cases 83

One
dismissal
principals

fourth

of the

cases

prosecuted dealt

or reassignment of principals.
in

Chicago

had

tenure

as

with

Prior to

1989,

principals, 84

where

downstate principals had tenure as teachers only.
they

were

under

multiyear

the

contracts.)

Therefore,

(Unless
cases

involving dismissal of principals tenured as principals; would
exclusively be characteristic of Chicago.

This meant that

when the Chicago Board of Education sought dismissal of a
principal (before 1989), the same procedural regulations were
followed as those for teachers.
Remediability of cause did play a role in the dismissal
of both tenure teachers and principals after it was amended to
SEC.

34-8585 on August 16,

1977.

As with downstate cases

81

stutzman v. Board of Education, 171 Ill. App. 3d 670,
525 N.E.2d 903 (1988).
Mccutcheon v. Board of Education of
the City of Chicago, 94 Ill. App.3d 993 (1981).
82

Chicago Board of Education v. Payne, 102 Ill. App. 3d
741, 430 N.E.2d 903 (1988).
Board of Education of the City
of Chicago v. Illinois State Board of Education, 112 Ill.
Dec. 236 (1987).
Morris v. Board of Education of the City
of Chicago, 96 Ill. App.3d 405 (1981). Lowe, 76 Ill. App.3d
348 (1979).
83

Di Caprio v. Redmond, 38 Ill. App.3d 1031 (1976).
Carrao v. Board of Education of the city of Chicago, 46 Ill.
App.3d 33 (1977).
84 ILL.

~Id.

REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 34-84 (1988).
at Sec. 34-85 (1977).
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involving remediability of cause, Chicago was bound to the
Gilliland86 two-prong analysis.
remediability,

such

as

Lowe

Court decisions regarding
v.

Board

paralleled those of downstate areas.
in

downstate

areas,

irremediability.

was

Education, 87

of

General incompetency as

difficult

to

prove

as

being

In both cases regarding incompetency, Morris

v. Board of Education of the City of ChicagoM in 1989, and
Board of Education v. Illinois state Board of Education89 in
1987, they were held to be remediable.

Where a teacher beat

children with a curtain rod, an extension cord, and club made
out of balsa wood nailed together and wrapped with masking
tape

in the Lowe90 case,

cause was held as

irremediable.

Insubordination on the part of a principal in Mccutcheon v.
Board of Education; 91 and possession of marijuana and later
cocaine

coupled

with

circumstances

in

which

a

teacher

functioned unprofessionally in Board of Education v. Payne92
constituted irremediable conduct.
Although
86Gilliland,
87

litigated

before

the

1977

amendment

for

67 Ill.2d 143 (1977).

Lowe, 76 Ill. App.3d 348 (1979).

MMorris, 96 Ill. App.3d 405 (1981).
89

Board of Education of the city of Chicago,
Dec.236 (1987).
90

Lowe, 76 Ill. App.3d 348 (1979).

91

McCutcheon, 94 Ill. App. 3d 993 (1981).

~Board of Education of the city of Chicago,
App.3d 993 (1981).

112 Ill.

102 Ill.
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determination of remediableness of cause to SEC. 34-85, the
court also upheld dismissal for a teacher's indecent liberty
with

a

child

Education93

while

and

on

vacation

insubordination

in

in

Carrao

v.

Board

of

DiCaprio

v.

Board

of

Education. 94
Other than cases involving disputes over the actual
cause for dismissal, three cases involved alleged procedural
errors.

The appellate court reversed decisions in two cases

where there were statutory violations on the part of the board
and

a

third

was

reviewed

because

of

inadequacies

in

plaintiff's counsel.
summary
A major

issue

litigated between

1976

whether a cause was remediable or irremediable.

and

1989

was

School boards

before motioning to dismiss teachers for cause were required
to

determine

if

the

cause

was

remediable

in

nature.

Accordingly if remediable, the school board was to provide
written notice to the teacher that if these causes were not
corrected,

that

Consistently,

the

may

result

courts

in

in

charges

reaching

for

decisions

dismissal.
in

cases

involving remediableness of cause, reviewed data according to
the standards set in Gilliland in 1977.

As stated previously

in this chapter, those elements from the Gilliland two-prong
analysis

included

93 carrao,
94

damage

caused

by

the

46 Ill. App.2d 33 (1977).

DiCaprio, 38 Ill. App.3d 1031 (1976).

behavior

to

the
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students, faculty, or school; and whether the behavior could
have been corrected had the teacher been warned.

In further

analyzing cases involving remediableness of cause in the area
of classroom management; the courts looked at the additional
criteria as to the degree of damage caused by the teacher
behavior to either the students, faculty.
Past tenure statutes did not define the limitations of
remedial

cause,

thus

if was

often

interpreted by local school boards.
an

action where

dismissals.

teachers

sought

broadly

and

favorably

This in turn, resulted in
administrative

review

of

These judicial reviews refined the parameters of

remediableness of cause.

As a whole remediation is still very

broad in its intent and will require future litigations to
further clarify its meaning.
as

a

result

more

strict

New case law will no doubt arise
remediation

provisions.

Will

statutory and case law continue to evolve where more rights
are garnered for the teacher or will it emphasize a balance
between the rights of the school versus the teacher?

CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
The central focus of this research was the study of
rights associated with dismissal for cause of tenured public
school teachers in Illinois between 1941 and 1989.

Tenure

itself was initiated in Illinois in 1917 for Chicago teachers
and 1941 for teachers in downstate school districts.
to

ascertain

implications

and

effects

upon

In order

dismissal

of

tenured teachers, both statutory and case law were examined as
primary sources regarding teacher dismissal rights from 1900
to 1989.

case law analysis encompassed eighty-two Illinois

court cases from the appellate and supreme court levels, and
eight federal courts involving dismissal of tenured teachers
in Illinois between 1900 to 1989.

Secondary sources included

legal periodicals, books, and dissertations.

The purpose in

researching primary and secondary sources was to:
1.

Examine and narrate the development of

Illinois

teacher employment statutes and
2.

Analyze the dismissal
secondary

teachers

in

throughout the state.
124

of tenured elementary and
public

school

districts

125

Through the use of content analysis, the study sought to
answer

the

following

research

questions

and

accompanying

statutory

law

history

variables:
1.

What

was

dismissal

the

legal

of tenured teachers

for

in elementary and

secondary public schools of Illinois?
- Criteria used for dismissing tenured teachers
identified in the Illinois Revised Statutes from
1941 to 1989.

2.

What was the legal case law history for dismissal
of tenured teachers

in elementary and secondary

public schools of Illinois?
- Types of teacher dismissal cases heard by Illinois
courts between 1900 and 1989.
- Grounds for dismissal cited by the school board.
- Allegations, behaviors, and actions cited by the
school board to establish grounds for dismissal.
- Issues brought forward by the dismissed tenured
teacher in appealing the school board's dismissal
decision.
Rationale given by the Illinois courts for
reversals or affirmations of public school board
decisions.
3.

What were the trends and issues for dismissal of
tenured teachers in elementary and secondary public.
schools in Illinois?
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- Major elements that influenced changes in
dismissal law for tenured teachers in Illinois
public schools.
Conclusions
Numerous

conclusions

were

drawn

from

the

research

regarding the rights of tenured teachers in Illinois from
1941-1989.
1.

Following are those conclusions:
Few employment

rights

afforded to downstate teachers

regarding dismissal

were

in the early part of this

century, from 1900 to 1940.
Before

the

Teacher

Tenure

Act

of

1941,

no

legal

safeguards were embodied into the Illinois State Code which
would have compelled school boards to offer teachers any form
of due process,

such

as

notice

or hearing,

discharged from a teaching position.

before being

Employment rights were

limited to dismissal for cause and continued contracts.
The Illinois Revised Statutes, 1882, vested boards of
education, with the power to dismiss and remove teachers for
specific cause.

However,

because there were no . statutory

procedures to safeguard a fair dismissal until 1941, teachers
were often discharged for capricious reasons.
Continued contracts were incorporated into the context
of employment legislation in the late twenties.

Under this

provision, a teacher could have been conferred a contract of
up to three years after the teacher had taught two consecutive
years of probationary service.

Al though a continuing contract
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allowed for a three-year contract, teachers were subject to
possible political or arbitrary actions by school officials as
there was no obligation on the part of the board to renew at
the end of the contract period.
After 1941, the trend in Illinois as a whole has

2.

been to legislate more strict criteria to safeguard the due
process rights of teachers conferred with tenure.
The Teacher Tenure Act of 1941, signaled the beginning
of the trend toward instilling more employment rights for
teachers at dismissal.

It was provided through statutory

amendments that teachers conferred with contractual continued
service in downstate areas or appointed in the Chicago area
were afforded the right to notice or dismissal, reasons, and
a hearing.

Later amendments required that the option for

administrative review be made available (1945); an impartial
hearing officer make the final decision regarding dismissal
(1975);

and

that

teachers

undergo

a

one-year

remediation

period for remediable deficiencies rated as unsatisfactory
before undergoing dismissal proceedings (1985).
3.

Tenure

provisions

for

Chicago

teachers

evolved

separately from tenure for downstate teachers.
Tenure for Chicago teachers legislated in 1917.

Other

rights were enacted for Chicago teachers after their downstate
counterparts.
remediability

of

This

has

cause

(1941

included

provisions

Downstate

and

1963

for:
for

Chicago), administrative review (1945 - Downstate and 1963 for
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Chicago), and impartial hearing officer (1975 - Downstate and
1979

for

Chicago) .

Stipulations

for

a

standardized

remediation period of one year were amended for both Chicago
and downstate areas in 1985.

In 1989, the Chicago remediation

period was changed from that of one-year to forty-five days.
4.

Before the tenure statute for downstate teachers was

enacted, litigated dismissal cases in downstate areas for 1900
through the 1930's, were mainly based on breach of contract in
relation to a school board's interpretation of either "best
interests" or "sufficient cause" for dismissal.
Before the establishment of tenure law for downstate
districts in Illinois in 1941, there was only one statutory
guideline
teacher:

for

school

boards

to

follow

when

dismissing

a

That of vesting boards of education and boards of

directors, through Illinois state statute, with the power to
dismiss

teachers

for

cause. 1

Most

often

school

boards

dismissed teachers for either "the interests of the school
require i t

112

or for "sufficient cause. 113

As early as 1901,

in Board of Education v. Stotlar, 4 it was recognized that a
school

board

could

have

had

capricious

intentions

in

dismissing a teacher under the "best interests" clause.
5.
1

Once the legislature amended statutory guidelines

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Secs. 115 and 127 (1900).

2Id.
3 rd.

4

stotlar, 95 Ill. App. 250 (1901).
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which

offered

downstate

teachers

employment

rights

at

dismissal in 1941, 5 the cases heard before Illinois courts
questioned interpretations as the statutes'

intent was not

always clear.
Often the construction of passages in tenure legislation
was not clear in meaning,

leaving these statutes open to

translation.

either

Ultimately

a

judicial

review

or

additional legislative amendments clarified the intent of the
statute.

For example in the original Tenure Act,

it was

required that a teacher could be eligible for contractual
continued

service,

service. 6

"Year" was not defined.

decision

in

upon

serving two consecutive years

1945,7 defined

•year'

of

An Illinois Supreme Court
to mean

twelve months.

Therefore, a teacher would have had to have served twenty-four
months of probationary service, in order to be eligible for
tenure.

A 1949 amendment to the Act, changed the word "year"

to "school term."

Upon the 1949 amendment, a teacher would

have then served probationary service according to the length
of a school term.
Tenure passages were not always subject to legislative
refinement.

The term 'remediable' has been the topic of many

Illinois appellate and supreme court cases; but has never been
delineated through the statutes.
5

Likewise,

dismissal

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 136c (1941).

6 Id.

7Anderson,

390 Ill. 412 (1945).

for
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'cause'

(as

specified

in

SEC.

34-85

for

those

teachers

employed in Chicago8 has never been legislatively defined.
6.

The determination of whether a cause for dismissal

was remediable or irremediable was a contended provision of
the Illinois Teacher Tenure Act between 1941 and 1989, often
subiect to judicial review.
Since tenure's inception in 1941, remediability of cause
has been a contended section.
the Tenure Act,

Although not overtly stated in

it was implied that a school district must

have first made the determination as to whether cause was
remediable

before

recommending

dismissal. 9

If

cause was

deemed remediable, the teacher must have first been served
reasonable

warning

deficiencies

which

in

writing

could

become

to

correct

charges

for

the

cited

dismissal.

Contrarily, if cause was cited as irremediable the board of
education could have made a motion to dismiss the tenured
teacher from employment.

It was a discretionary power of the

board of education to decide if a cause was remediable or
irremediable.

Quite logically, dismissal was more expedient

if the school board acknowledged cause as irremediable.

This

point became all the more evident, when a 1985 amendment added
a one-year remediation period. 10
Although remediability was not defined in the statutes,
8 ILL.

9

REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 34-85 (1917-1989).

Id. at Sec. 136c (1941).

10

Id. at Sec. 24-12 ( 1985) .
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it was

reviewed extensively

necessary

that

school

in

districts

judicial venues.
study

legal

regarding the parameters of remediability,

It was

developments

before deciding

upon dismissing a teacher.
7.

Judicial interpretations of remediability evolved

over a forty-eight year period. from a stance where a board of
education was
making

the

designated

broad

determination

of

discretationary

remediability,

powers

to

a

in

balance

between protecting the rights of the teacher against the best
interests of the school.
The

"guiding

star"

in

the

Meredith

decision, 11

philosophy was the judicial rule of thumb for court cases
involving remediability of cause for dismissal from 1955 to
1977.

In

this

decision

the

court

advanced

adjucative

authority to boards of education, by leaving remediability
open to the board's interpretation of ·what constitutes the
best interests of the school district.

The only qualifier for

judicial interference was if the board acted maliciously,
capriciously, or arbitrarily.
decision of 1977,
developed

to

determination

this posture changed when criteria were

guide
of

However, with the Gilliland 12

the

examination

irremediable

of

cause.

a

school

Gilliland

board's
directed

application of a two-prong analysis for remediability.

It

first posed the question of whether the causes damaged the
11

Meredith, 7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1955).

12

Gilliland, 67 Ill. 2d 143 (1977).
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students,

faculty

or

school

and

second

if

the

conduct

resulting in that damage could have been corrected had the
teacher's superior warned him or her? 13

This court decision

took into consideration the needs of the school in the first
prong of the analysis, without forsaking the rights of the
teacher as evidenced in the second prong of the analysis.
Further judicial

review

of remediability after 1977

allowed for this same balance between the school
teacher.

Immorality was noted in Fadler v.

and the

Illinois State

Board of Education 14 in 1987, as being irremediable, with the
comments that a board need not wait for adverse effects while
other students may become subjected to future abuse.

While in

regards to excessive discipline the Illinois Supreme Court of
Board of Education of School District 131 v. Illinois State
Board

of

Education, 15

applied

not

only

the

criterion

of

Gilliland 16 but also looked at the level of injury to the
students.
8.

Major elements that influenced changes in statutory

dismissal law were union lobbying. public opinion, and case
law at both the local and federal levels.
The primary thrust for tenure was through lobbying by

14 Fadler,

153 Ill. App.3d 1024 (1087).

15 Board

of Education of School
Ap.3d 820 (1980).
16Gilliland,

District

67 Ill. 2d 143 ( 1977) .

131,

82

Ill.
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teacher's unions, first in Chicago and later in the downstate
areas.

To this date teacher's unions play a large role in the

advances of teacher's rights

in general.

Not necessarily

paralleling the viewpoints of teacher's unions, but definitely
as influential as public opinion.
shape

and mold the

local

Public tenets not only

political

and

legal

arena,

but

nationally as well.
Perhaps as a result of the interplay between the first
two elements, the third which is the legal comes into effect.
However within the legal sector, statutory law will generate
case law and case law will generate changes in statutory law.
Of the three, one element has not outranked the others
in creating the most modifications in tenure law.

Rather each

has played a part in change, separately or together.
9.

Although most litigated dismissal cases dealt with

either statutory interpretation or remediability of cause, the
most currently cited cause within these cases was deficiencies
based on incompetency.

More often, the behavior and actions

related to a type of classroom management.
In cases which reached the appellate or supreme court
level in Illinois between 1976 and 1989, thirty-one percent of
the cases were based on incompetency as cause for dismissal.
This

amount

was

almost

four

times

as

many

as

those

incompetency cases litigated at Illinois appellate and Supreme
courts between 1961 to 1975.

(Cases between 1941 and 1961

were primarily related to statute interpretation.)

National
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opinions on education are such that schools are now being held
more accountable for student achievement.

Translating this to

the local school level, there will be less tolerance for the
incompetent

teacher

due

to

societal

demands

placed

upon

education.
10.

After 1941. cases were reversed when the cause was

found to be remediable in nature of when a procedural error
occurred in the course of the dismissal process.
As previously stated, school districts were found to be
without jurisdiction when a cause was found to be remediable,
and decisions were apt to be reversed.

With increasingly

technical procedures in tenure law, more procedural errors are
being made by school districts.

Eleven cases between 1975 and

1989 in Illinois were prosecuted over disputes where school
boards were at fault over not adhering to guidelines, such as
timelines, specific to tenure legislation.
Policy Recommendations
Analysis of primary and secondary sources, revealed that
although
statutes

many

procedural

governing

regulations

dismissal,

exist

school

in

Illinois

districts

can

successfully dismiss teachers without violating a teacher's
substantive rights.

Analysis revealed that appeals were most

commonly based on cause being remediable in nature; or because
statute-based provisions for dismissal were not adhered to by
the board of education.

In view of this,

public school

officials should be aware of the following considerations when
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contemplating the dismissal of a tenured teacher.
Statutory and Case Law Policy Regarding Remediability of Cause
Since 1941, the Illinois Revised Code had required that:
a school board must give the teacher reasonable warning in
writing stating specifically the causes which, if not
removed may result in charges; before setting charies
stemming from causes that were considered remediable.
If a cause for dismissal was later found to be remediable
either by
board's

the hearing officer or the

recommendation

to

dismiss

courts,

will

be

the

school

overturned.

Remediable causes required specific statutory procedures.

In

their

to

absence

a

school

would

be

without

jurisdiction

proceed with dismissal.

Therefore, it is very critical that

school

carefully

districts

first

remediable or irremediable.

decide

that

a

cause

is

In weighing this decision, they

can be guided by the following considerations derived from
Illinois Appellate and Supreme Court decisions:
• Did any of the causes damage the students, faculty,
or school?

Could the conduct resulting in that

damage have been corrected had the teacher's superiors
warned him or her?

(Gilliland v. Board of Education

of Pleasant View Consolidated School District No.
622). 18
. Uncorrected causes for dismissal which were
originally remediable in nature, could be irremediable

17 ILL.

REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 24-12 (1941).

18Gilliland,

67 Ill. 2d 143 (1977).
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if continued over a long period of time.

(Gilliland

vs Board of Education of Pleasant View Consolidated
School District No. 622) . 19
Certain causes were

held as

irremediable under

the

following conditions:
. Excessive discipline when:
- The behavior displayed by the

teacher exhibited

continuing patterns of cruelty and violated his
relationship with students (Fender v. School
District No. 25).~
- The punishment inflicted was so severe as to have
been

deemed

unreasonable

(Welch

v.

Board

of

Education Bement Community Unit School District
No. 5). 21
- No amount of warning given to the teacher could
have remedied the damage done the students (Welch
v. Board of Education Bement Community Unit School
District No. 5).u
. Immorality when:
- The behavior could not be remedied by a

simple

written warning (Fadler v. Illinois State Board of

19Id.

~Fender, 79 Ill. App.3d 736 (1976).
21 Welch,
22Id.

45 Ill. App. 3d 35 (1977).
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Education) . 23
- The conduct was not only harmful to the individual
student-teacher

relationships,

but

was

equally

harmful to the reputation of the faculty and school
(Fadler v. Illinois State Board of Education) . 24
Statutory Requirements for Dismissal
Policy recommendations in this area can be summarized in
one sentence.
procedural

In order to prevent decision reversals due to

errors,

boards

of education

should

follow

mandated timelines and other procedural requirements

any
in a

timely fashion according to the letter of the law.
Recommendations for Further Study
In order to study dismissal
Illinois,
tenure.

of tenured teachers

in

it was also necessary to study the elements of

However due to the constraints of research it was not

possible to study in depth the political aspects of tenure and
dismissal legislation.

A particular area of study could be

employment legislation for Chicago Public Schools.
has been,
tenure,
that

legislatively,

an entity to

itself.

Chicago
Regarding

legal aspects for Chicago were very different from

of

the

development

downstate
of

Chicago

school

districts.

teacher

The

employment

political

provisions,

including union influences, deserves a closer look.

In order

to more fully understand the history of tenure in Chicago, a
23 Fadler,
24rd.

153 Ill. App.3d 1024 (1987).
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comparison study may be made of Chicago and other large urban
cities in the United States.

Certainly worth comparing would

be the dismissal policies of Illinois against states with
similar characteristics.
Incompetency seems to be an area of growing concern to
school boards, as evidenced by the amount of dismissal cases
where the cause was incompetency.
one

might

research

Illinois

To look for further trends
hearing

officer

decisions

pertaining to dismissal of tenured teachers for incompetency.
Immorality is another area where guidelines are being
developed regarding dismissal.
be those with a

Of particular interest might

constitutional overlay.

What issues may

evolve at the federal level and how might this affect future
policy development of state statutes.
In general, remediation of cause has made an impact on
trends in case law in Illinois.

A more in-depth analysis can

be made of remediation taking into consideration the aftermath
of the new remediation legislation in Illinois.
balance of power moving
school boards?

Where is the

in Illinois amongst teachers and

Is the power of the school board waning?

are the trends and issues?

What
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